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ABSTRACT 
 
Security Schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks with Mobile Sink. (May 2010) 
Amar Adnan Rasheed, B.S., University of Baghdad; 
M.S., Northeastern Illinois University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Rabi N. Mahapatra 
 
Mobile sinks are vital in many wireless sensor applications for efficient data collection, 
data querying, and localized sensor reprogramming. Mobile sinks prolong the lifetime of 
a sensor network. However, when sensor networks with mobile sinks are deployed in a 
hostile environment, security became a critical issue. They become exposed to varieties 
of malicious attacks. Thus, anti threats schemes and security services, such as mobile 
sink’s authentication and pairwise key establishment, are essential components for the 
secure operation of such networks. 
Due to the sensors, limited resources designing efficient security schemes with 
low communication overhead to secure communication links between sensors and MS 
(Mobile Sink) is not a trivial task. In addition to the sensors limited resources, sink mo-
bility required frequent exchange of cryptography information between the sensors and 
MS each time the MS updates its location which imposes extra communication overhead 
on the sensors.    
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In this dissertation, we consider a number of security schemes for WSN (wireless 
sensor network) with MS. The schemes offer high network’s resiliency and low commu-
nication overhead against nodes capture, MS replication and wormhole attacks.  
We propose two schemes based on the polynomial pool scheme for tolerating 
nodes capture: the probabilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme combined with 
polynomial pool scheme, and the Q-composite generation key scheme combined with 
polynomial pool scheme. The schemes ensure low communication overhead and high 
resiliency. 
 For anti MS replication attack scheme, we propose the multiple polynomial 
pools scheme that provide much higher resiliency to MS replication attack as compared 
to the single polynomial pool approach.  
Furthermore, to improve the network resiliency against wormhole attack, two de-
fensive mechanisms were developed according to the MS mobility type. In the first 
technique, MS uses controlled mobility. We investigate the problem of using a single 
authentication code by sensors network to verify the source of MS beacons, and then we 
develop a defensive approach that divide the sensor network into different authentication 
code’s grids. In the second technique, random mobility is used by MS. We explore the 
use of different communication channels available in the sensor hardware combined with 
polynomial pool scheme. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobility is exploited in the field of wireless sensor network [1], [2], [3], [4] to circum-
vent multi-hop relaying and to reduce energy consumption [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] at nodes 
near the base station, and hence elongate the lifetime of the network. Mobile elements 
already exist in the deployment environment; a network node can be attached to these 
mobile elements for data collection [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. Otherwise, mobile 
elements are part of the network infrastructure itself and can be controlled by the net-
work [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. There exist a number of sensor networks applica-
tions that use mobile sinks in their operations, such as data collections in hazardous envi-
ronments, localize reprogramming, and military navigation. Due to the their operating 
nature, they often left unattended, hence prone to different kinds of malicious attacks 
such as the Sybil attacks [22], [23], [24], clone attacks [25], [26], node replication at-
tacks [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], mobile sink replication attacks, and wormhole attacks. 
Thus, security services, (such as authentication and pairwise key establishment), and 
countermeasure attacks are vital.  
In this dissertation, we examine two security challenges for sensor network with 
MS: one security challenge is to cultivate efficient security schemes with low communi-
cation overhead that use authentication and pairwise keys establishment between sensors 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Sys-
tems.  
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and MS to tolerate nodes capture and mobile sink replication attack. Since to establish 
secure links with the MS, frequent exchange of cryptography information between the 
sensors and MS are required each time the MS update its location which imposes extra 
communication overhead on the constrained resources sensors unlike sensor network 
with a fixed localized sink. Where after deployment, sensors and the sink exchange cryp-
tography information only once to establish a securely connected network. The other 
challenge is to develop security techniques that are based on key pre-distribution 
schemes to provide network’s resiliency against wormhole attack. 
Throughout this dissertation, we propose a number of security schemes for wire-
less sensor network with MS that addresses the above security challenges and how our 
proposed security based key pre-distribution schemes furnish better network resiliency 
against nodes capture, mobile sink replication, and wormhole attacks compared to a 
number of existing schemes for sensor networks with fixed localized sinks. 
Finally, we propose an energy-efficient hybrid data collection architecture [21] 
based on controllably mobile infrastructure for a class of applications in which sensor 
networks provide both low-priority and high-priority data. High-priority data require a 
data delivery scheme with low latency and high fidelity. Meanwhile low-priority data 
may tolerate high-latency data delivery. 
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A. SECURITY SCHEMES FOR TOLERATING NODES CAPTURE AND MOBILE         
SINK REPLICATION ATTACK 
 
Security schemes that provide authentication and pairwise keys establishment between 
communicating nodes have been widely studied in general network environments. These 
security schemes were widely known as general key agreement schemes, they usually 
offer network tolerance to nodes capture. There are three types of general key agreement 
schemes: trusted-server scheme, self-enforcing scheme, and key pre-distribution scheme. 
The trusted-server scheme depends on a trusted server for key agreement between nodes. 
This type of scheme is not suitable for sensor networks because there is no trusted infra-
structure in sensor networks. The self-enforcing scheme depends on asymmetric crypto-
graphy, such as key agreement using public key certificates. However, limited computa-
tion and energy resources of sensor nodes often make it undesirable to use public key 
algorithms. The third type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution [32], [33], 
[34], [35], [36], [37], [38] where key information is distributed among all sensor nodes 
prior to deployment.  
The simplest key pre-distribution scheme is to use a global pre-shared among the 
MS and sensor nodes. This scheme offer very low network resiliency to nodes capture 
and mobile sink replication attack. Since the capture of a single sensor will lead an at-
tacker to get hold of the pre-shared key and then be able to lunch a wide range network 
mobile sink replication attack. A more robust scheme against nodes capture had been 
proposed by Eschenauer and Gilgor [32], it called the probabilistic key pre-distribution 
scheme. The main idea was to let each sensor node randomly pick a set of keys from a 
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key pool before deployment so any two sensors have a certain probability of sharing at 
least one common key. Chan et al. [33], [34] further extended this idea and developed 
two key pre-distribution schemes: Q-composite key pre-distribution scheme and random 
pairwise keys scheme. The Q-composite key pre-distribution scheme also uses a key 
pool but requires two sensor nodes compute a pairwise key from at least Q pre-
distributed keys they share. The random pairwise keys scheme randomly picks pairs of 
sensor nodes and assigns each pair a unique random key. Both schemes improve the se-
curity over the basic probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme. 
The main drawbacks in both the probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme and the 
Q-composite scheme are high communication overhead and as the number of compro-
mised nodes increases, the fraction of affected pairwise keys increases quickly As a re-
sult, a small number of compromised nodes may affect a large fraction of pairwise keys 
and will then lead to a large scale mobile sink replication attack. 
An enhanced scheme using the t-degree bivariate key polynomial was proposed 
by Liu and Ning [35]. They develop a general framework for pairwise key establishment 
using polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution protocol [38] and the probabilistic key 
distribution in [32], [34]. Their scheme provides higher network’s resiliency to nodes 
capture compared to the global pre-shared key, the probabilistic key pre-distribution 
scheme [32], and the Q-composite scheme [34], it can only tolerate no more than t com-
promised nodes, where the value of t is limited by the memory available in sensor nodes. 
Therefore, we consider the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme as the 
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basic component in our proposed schemes for network resiliency and low communica-
tion overhead against nodes capture and mobile sink replication attack. 
In this dissertation, we contemplate two security schemes for tolerating nodes 
capture: the probabilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme combined with poly-
nomial pool scheme, and the Q-composite generation key scheme combined with poly-
nomial pool scheme [39], [40]. These schemes enable a mobile sink to establish a secure 
data communication link with any sensor nodes on the fly and with low communication 
overhead. The two proposed schemes are based on the polynomial pool-based key pre-
distribution scheme, the probabilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme, and the Q-
composite scheme. The security analysis in this dissertation indicates that these two 
schemes assures, with high probability and low communication overhead, that any sen-
sor node can establish a pairwise key with the mobile sink. Finally, we compare the two 
proposed key pre-distribution schemes with the Q-composite scheme, the probabilistic 
key pre-distribution scheme, and the polynomial pool-based scheme, our analytical re-
sults clearly show that our schemes perform better in terms of network resilience to 
nodes capture than existing schemes if used in wireless sensor network with mobile sink.  
For the anti mobile sink replication attack scheme, we propose a scheme called 
the three-tier security scheme. In this new security framework [41], [42], A small frac-
tion of pre-selected sensor nodes, called the stationary access nodes, act as authentica-
tion access points to the network and to trigger sensor nodes to transmit their aggregated 
data to mobile sinks. A mobile sink sends data request messages to sensor nodes via a 
stationary access node, these mobile sink data request messages will initiate the statio-
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nary access node to trigger sensor nodes to transmit their data to the requested mobile 
sink. The scheme uses two separate polynomial pools: the mobile polynomial pool and 
the static polynomial pool. The mobile Polynomial pool used for authentication and keys 
setup between mobile sinks and stationary access nodes. The static polynomial pool is 
used for authentication and pairwise key establishment between sensor nodes and statio-
nary access nodes. 
 
B. ANTI WORMHOLE ATTACK SCHEMES 
 
A wormhole attack is very difficult to detect, because it can be launched without 
compromising either the host or the integrity and authenticity of the communication 
network [43], [44], [45]. 
Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson describe a solution for the threat of a wormhole 
attack, based on geographical and temporal packet leashes. The use of geographical 
leashes assumes knowledge of the node location. The use of temporal leashes requires 
all nodes to have tightly synchronized clocks and demands computational power, which 
according to the authors, is beyond the capability of sensors [43]. S. Capkun, L. Buttyan, 
J. Hubaux in [44], and Y. Hu, A. Perrig and D. Johnson in [43] propose a defense against 
wormhole attacks based on measurement of the time of flight of a message in a chal-
lenge–reply scheme. Such a scheme assumes that sensors are able to execute time mea-
surements of nanosecond precision and, hence, this scheme requires very accurate clocks 
at each sensor. In addition, distance estimates based on the time of flight are sensitive to 
distance-enlargement errors. 
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All the above anti-wormhole attack solutions were implemented on sensor 
networks with static nodes. In this study, we propose two techniques that are suitable 
only for sensor networks with MS using random or control mobility to collect sensors 
data. The first technique was based on wireless sensor network that use a mobile sink to 
collect data along a pre-determine path [46]. We propose an efficient security scheme, 
which divides the sink’s data collection path into grids, sensors in each grid, uses secret 
keying information and collision-resistant hash functions to authenticate the source of 
beacons. Through probabilistic analysis and definitive simulation, the proposed scheme 
shows with 60% of the grids under wormhole attacks, the probability that a node reply to 
a malicious beacon is 0.1. The second technique was design for sensor network with MS 
that uses random mobility for data gathering [47]. The proposed technique uses the 
polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme [35] and the multiple channels 
available on the sensor hardware. It allows the MS to establish a direct secure link with 
any sensor node and over a communication channel randomly selected from a set of c 
available channels. Through quantitative analyses, it is shown that even when 50% of a 
sensor node’s neighbors are malicious devices, the provision of one extra available 
channel for communication with the mobile sink reduces the probability of a wormhole 
attack to almost zero. 
 
C. AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT DATA COLLECTION SCHEME IN WSN WITH MS 
 
Our approach exploits the design of a network that supports a hybrid data delivery 
scheme to enhance the network performance and reduces total network energy usage 
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[21]. In our system design two delivery schemes are deployed for purposes of compari-
son. The first is the traditional ad hoc approach to deliver high-priority data with high 
fidelity and low latency. The second presents a controllable infrastructure in the sensor 
field, which acts as low-priority data collection agent. Through simulations, we show 
that our proposed approach can provide substantial energy saving in this class of sensor 
application compared to the traditional multi-hop approach used alone. 
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CHAPTER II 
KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FOR TOLERATING NODES 
CAPTURE IN SENSOR NETWORK WITH MS 
 
In this chapter, we propose two key pre-distribution schemes for tolerating nodes capture 
in wireless sensor network with MS. In the predicating of our security schemes, we ex-
ploit the use of either the probabilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme [48] or the 
Q-composite scheme [34] in conjunction with the polynomial pool-based key pre-
distribution scheme [35] to establish a secure link between a mobile sink and a sensor 
node and improve the network resilience to nodes captures. First, we propose a scheme 
that combines the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution [35] with the probabilistic 
generation key pre-distribution scheme [48] to establish a pairwise key between mobile 
sink and any sensor node. Second, we develop a scheme that uses the Q-composite 
scheme in conjunction with polynomial pool-based scheme. Prior to network deploy-
ment, every sensor node is pre-loaded with polynomial shares of a randomly selected 
subset of s polynomials out of |Sp| polynomials, called the polynomial ring. In addition, 
every sensor node is pre-loaded with a randomly selected subset of k ( sk  ) generation 
keys out of |Sk| generation keys, called the generation key ring. The mobile sink is pre-
loaded with a randomly selected subset of s polynomial out of |Sp| and a large subset of 
m (m >> k) generation keys out of |Sk|. Having a large a number of generation key in the 
mobile sink ensure that both the mobile sink and a sensor node share at least one genera-
tion key with high probability. The two proposed schemes guarantee that any sensor 
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node can establish a pairwise key with a mobile sink with high probability and without 
sacrificing security. Security analyses indicate that the two schemes provide a higher 
probability for non-compromised sensors to establish a secure communication with the 
mobile sink than previous schemes [34], [35], [48].  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section A presents related works. 
Section B gives an overview of the polynomial pool-based scheme. Sections C & D 
presents the two proposed key pre-distribution schemes. Section E concludes the chap-
ter. 
 
A. RELATED WORK 
 
Eschenauer and Gligor [32] proposed the first key pre-distribution scheme for sensor 
networks, which we will call it the random key distribution scheme. In this scheme, a 
large pool of random keys is generated at the server prior to the network deployment. 
For each sensor node, the server randomly selects a subset of keys, called the key ring. 
Two sensor nodes that share at least one common key in their key rings are able to estab-
lish a secure link. Nodes that cannot establish a secure link directly might engage in a 
key path discovery scheme.  
In the previous scheme, the capture of a node may lead to compromising a link 
between two non-captured nodes, since these two nodes may have use the same key to 
secure their communication. To reduce the fraction of compromised links between non-
compromised nodes, a modification to the random key scheme, called the Q-composite 
scheme, is presented in [34]. The authors of this scheme proposed that in order for two 
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nodes to establish a secure communication link, they are required to share at least Q 
common keys in their key rings. The secret common key is the hash of the Q common 
keys. 
Hussain, Kausar, and Masood [48] proposed a probabilistic generation key pre-
distribution scheme based on the random key distribution for heterogeneous sensor net-
works. In a key generation process, instead of generating a large pool of random keys, a 
key pool is represented by a small number of generation keys. They assume the network 
consists of a small number of powerful nodes, called H-sensors, and a very large number 
of low-end sensors (L-sensors). The L-sensors have very limited computation, commu-
nication, energy supply, and storage capability; the H-sensors have more storage, com-
putation, and storage capability. Prior to the network deployment, the setup server gene-
rates a pool of random generation key. By applying a hash algorithm on each generation 
key and publicly known seed value, key chains are generated. Every key chain has its 
unique ID. The total number of key chains forms complete key pool. The setup server 
assigns each L-sensor r random generation keys. From these random generation keys, 
Nr  random keys can be calculated effectively. Each H-sensor is pre-loaded with M 
randomly selected generation keys, where M >> r.    
Another type of general networks cryptographic algorithms is called the thre-
shold cryptography. This scheme was first proposed in [49] and further investigated in 
[38]. Such a scheme, in which every sensor node is pre-loaded with coefficients of a 
symmetric bivariate polynomial evaluated at one of its variables using its ID value, The 
symmetry property of a polynomial allows every node to establish a pairwise key with 
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every neighbor node or any node in the network evaluated at their ID values. For an ad-
versary to compromise a communication link between two non-compromised nodes, 
he/she must capture at least a certain number of sensors to reconstruct the bivariate po-
lynomial from its shares stored in the nodes and break the system. For a polynomial of 
degree t, the scheme provides unconditional secrecy if no more than t sensors collude. 
Liu and Ning [35] developed a general framework for pairwise key establishment based 
on the polynomial-based key pre-distribution protocol [38] and the probabilistic key dis-
tribution in [32], [34]. Their scheme shows that when the fraction of captured nodes is 
less than 60%, it provides a significantly higher probability for non-compromised sen-
sors to establish secure communication links than the previous methods. Moreover, un-
less the number of compromised nodes sharing a common polynomial exceeds a thre-
shold. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE POLYNOMIAL POOL-BASED KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION 
SCHEME 
 
In this section, we briefly review the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution 
scheme. The key setup server randomly generates bivariate t-degree polynomials with 
coefficients over a finite field GF(λ), where λ is a prime number large enough to ac-
commodate a cryptographic key. Such that the polynomials have the property of                
f (x,y) = f (y,x). 
f (x,y) =                  , where aij=aji.  
t
tji
ji
ij yxa
,0
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To identify the different polynomials, the setup server may assign each poly-
nomial a unique id, namely ID. For every sensor node u, the setup server chooses a sub-
set of n polynomials from the polynomial pool and assigns shares of these n polynomials 
to node u. For each polynomial share of fID(x, y), pre-loaded in sensor node u, the setup 
server computes fID(u, y). For any two sensor nodes, u and v, node u computes the key 
fID(u,v) at each of its randomly assigned shared polynomials by evaluating fID(u, y) at 
point v. Node v can compute its key fID(v,u) by evaluating fID(v, y) at point u. If the two 
nodes can successfully establish a common key, there is no need to start path key estab-
lishment. Otherwise, sensors start path key establishment, trying to establish a pairwise 
key with the help of other intermediate nodes. 
 
C. PROBABILISTIC GENERATION KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME COM-
BINED WITH THE POLYNOMIAL POOL-BASED SCHEME 
 
We assume a typical sensor network that has hundreds to several thousands of low-cost, 
power-constrained, limited-computation power and storage capability nodes. Sensor 
nodes conserve communication energy by aggregating the data in their internal buffer. 
The network has a high-end mobile sink. The mobile sink is more powerful than any 
sensor. It has more computation, communication, energy supply, and storage capability. 
It acts as an agent to collect sensor readings. Every sensor node is able to store up to 210 
keys; however, a MS is capable of storing up to 1,200 keys.  
The key establishment patterns for a secure link between a node and the MS falls 
into two categories: direct and indirect MS-sensor path key establishment. In direct key 
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establishment, the mobile sink and the sensor share at least a common bivariate poly-
nomial and at least one common generation key. In MS-sensor path key establishment, 
MS and a sensor node u try to establish a pairwise key with the help of an intermediate 
node i. Node i must shares a pairwise key with both the MS and sensor node u. Node i 
randomly generates a new shared key that will be sent directly to MS and indirectly to 
node u over the secure path i—MS—u. 
In this chapter, we are considering a large sensor network (>1,000 sensor nodes) 
with a communication range (>30 neighboring nodes within the communication 
range). 
The basic idea of our scheme [39], [40] can be described as the combination of 
polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution [35] and the probabilistic generation key 
pre-distribution scheme [48]. The general framework of the proposed scheme consists of 
three phases: 
 Polynomial and generation key subsets assignments: Initially, the setup server 
separately generates two pools, a pool of |Sp| random bivariate polynomials, each with a 
unique id namely IDp and of degree-t, and a pool of |Sk| random generation keys each 
with a unique id namely IDgk. Prior to network deployment, for every sensor node u, the 
setup server randomly picks a subset of s polynomials out of |Sp| and assigns polynomial 
shares of these s polynomials to the sensor node. In addition, for every sensor node u, the 
setup server randomly selects a subset of k ( sk  ) generation keys out of |Sk| and assigns 
them to the sensor node u. From these k generation keys, Ck   random keys can be calcu-
lated effectively, where C is the total number of keys generated independently via a 
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unique generation key gi and publicly known seed S. By applying a keyed hash algo-
rithm repeatedly [50], the n-th key using a generation key gi, and a publicly known seed 
S is computed as:  
 K=Hash n (S, gi)                                                  (2.1) 
For the MS, the setup server picks randomly a subset of m (m >> k) generation 
keys out of |Sk|, and a subset of s polynomials out of |Sp|. Having a large number of gen-
eration keys in the mobile sink guarantee that MS can discover a single common genera-
tion key with a sensor with high probability. The MS can establish a pairwise data-
communication key with any sensor node on the fly. If the MS and a sensor node share 
at least one generation key and a common bivariate polynomial, the two can establish a 
secure data-communication link directly. However, if the MS and the sensor node do not 
share sufficient bivariate polynomials, the MS and the sensor node start a MS-sensor 
path key discovery, trying to establish a pairwise data-communication key with the help 
of other nodes.  
Mobile sink-sensor direct key establishment: In the case of establishing a secure 
MS-sensor link dynamically between MS and any node u within its communication 
range. First, MS and a sensor u need to discover that both have the polynomial shares of 
a common polynomial. The MS broadcasts hello messages containing the MS id (IDms). 
Sensor node u within the MS range that heard the MS’s hello message can compute its 
keys by evaluating each of its assigned polynomial shares fID(u, y) at point IDms. The 
sensor node u sends one message for each computed s key containing the ID of the node 
and s client puzzles.  One such client puzzle is the Merkle puzzle [51]. If the MS re-
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sponds with the correct answer to at least one client puzzle, it is thus identified as having 
the same polynomial shares of a common polynomial. Second, after discovering a shared 
polynomial between MS and the sensor node u, the MS broadcast messages which con-
tain a randomly generated number n where [0 n  C], if node u heard the MS message, 
then for each pre-loaded generation key, and a publicly known seed S, u can compute its 
n-th keys as in (1). For discovering that both u and the MS share at least a common gen-
eration key, node u uses the same method (Merkle puzzle [51]). 
After the shared polynomial and the shared generation key discoveries, a new 
MS-sensor data-communication link key Kd is generated as the hash of the key evaluated 
from the shared polynomial and the key computed from the shared generation key. MS-
sensor key-setup is not performed between the MS and any node if at least the two do 
not share a common generation key or do not have the polynomial shares of a common 
polynomial. 
Mobile sink-sensor path key discovery: This phase occur between a sensor node 
and the MS. If the MS fails to establish a MS-sensor secure link directly, then it must 
start the MS-sensor path key discovery phase. In this phase, MS needs to discover an 
intermediate node that share a common polynomial with MS and a common polynomial 
with the destination node. We consider that MS can find a common generation key with 
the destination node with high probability (0.99). To establish a MS-sensor pairwise key 
with a destination node Y, MS needs to find a secure MS-sensor path through some in-
termediate nodes along the path, which can establish secure MS-sensor pairwise keys 
directly with both the MS and the destination node Y. MS broadcasts a request message, 
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which includes two lists of polynomial IDs. One polynomial ID list is for the MS. The 
other list is for the destination node Y. For any two sensor nodes want to establish a 
common key, both must discover that they share at least a common polynomial only. If 
an intermediate node v receives this request message is able to establish a common key 
with both of MS and the destination node Y, it replies with a message that contains two 
encrypted copies of a randomly generated key Kc: one encrypted by the pairwise key 
with the MS; the other by the pairwise key with the destination node. Both MS and Y 
can get the new key Kc from this message. The new MS-sensor data-communication link 
key is the hash value of Kc and the key computed form the shared generation key be-
tween MS and node Y.  
 
1. Security Analysis 
 
Similar to the analysis in [35] and [48], the probability p that both the MS and a sensor 
node u share the same bivariate polynomial is the probability that the two can establish 
MS-sensor polynomial-based secure link directly, and can be estimated by 
     
   (2.2) 
The probability q, that both MS and a sensor node u have a common generation 
key in their generation keys rings is the probability that both MS and node u can estab-
lish a MS-sensor random key-based secure link, and can be computed as 
    
   (2.3) 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Fig. 1. The probability pc that MS can establish a secure data link with any node vs. the 
size of the polynomial pool and combinations of k, |Sk|, and s 
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As described earlier, if a direct secure data-communication key Kd is generated as 
the hash of the polynomial-based key and the random key-based key, then the probabili-
ty Pc that MS can establish a secure data-communication key Kd with any node is Pc=pq. 
Fig. [1(a), 1(b), and 1(c)] show the relationship between Pc and the combinations of k, 
|Sk|, s, and |Sp|. To predict that with high probability that MS shares at least a common 
generation key with any sensor node within its range, we assume MS to be pre-loaded 
with large number of generation keys (m >> k). However, MS is pre-loaded with the 
same number of bivariate polynomials as any sensor node in the network (s =2), the 
probability that both MS and any sensor node in its range have the same bivariate poly-
nomials is low. It is easy to see that the closer s and |Sp|, the more likely that MS and a 
sensor node can establish a pairwise key. 
Now we consider the probability that both MS and a sensor node can establish a 
data-communication key through MS-sensor direct establishment and MS-sensor path 
key discovery. Let d denote the average number of sensor nodes within the MS data 
communication range. If MS needs to establish a secure data-communication key direct-
ly or indirectly with any of the d nodes, for example node u, let us consider any of the 
remaining d-1 nodes. The probability that it shares a pairwise key with both MS and 
node u, is qp2. Both MS and node u can establish a common data-communication key as 
long as one of the   d-1 nodes can act as an intermediate node. Then the probability that 
MS and node u establishing a pairwise data-communication key (directly or indirectly) is 
Pd=1-(1-pq)(1-p2q2)d. Fig. [2(a) and 2(b)], presents the relationship between Pd and the 
combinations of p, q and d. We investigate the security resilience of our proposed 
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scheme against node compromise attack. We assume an attacker randomly compromised 
x sensor nodes. For each compromised node, the attacker can obtain k generation keys. 
The probability that a given generation key is not chosen by a non-compromised node is 
 
 
 
 
(a) d = 10 
(b) d = 60 
Fig. 2. The probability Pd of establishing a secure data link with MS vs. combinations of 
p, q and d 
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(1- k/|Sk|). If there are x compromised nodes, the probability that a given generation key 
is not compromised is (1- k/|Sk|)x. The expected fraction of total generation keys com-
promised is thus 
           (2.4) 
In the case of the captured bivariate polynomials of degree t, the attacker cannot 
determine the non-compromised polynomial-based key if he/she has captured no more 
than t sensors. Similar to the analysis in [35], let us assume the case where the number of 
compromised sensors x > t. The probability of any polynomial being chosen for a sensor 
node is (s/|Sp|), and the probability of this polynomial being chosen exactly j times 
among x sensor nodes is  
(2.5) 
 
Thus the probability of polynomial-based key being compromised between non-
compromised sensors is          
(2.6) 
 
From equations (2.4) and (2.6), the probability that a data communication link 
between MS and any non-compromised sensor node being compromised is 
(2.7) 
 
Similar to the scheme in [35], to improve the security of the polynomial-pool 
based scheme and prevent an attacker who has some knowledge of the polynomial dis-
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tribution over the sensor nodes, that he/she can derived  by compromising t+1 nodes . 
We assume each polynomial be used at most t+1 times. (We assume MS as one of the 
t+1 nodes). As a result, an attacker cannot recover a polynomial unless he/she captures 
all related nodes, including the mobile sink.  
Now we compare the proposed scheme with the scheme in [48], the Q-composite 
[34], and the polynomial pool-based scheme [35]. We assume the same storage constrain 
for all schemes. Fig. [3(a) and 3(b)] show the fraction of compromised data links be-
tween non-compromised sensors and MS with q =0.99 and different p. These figures 
clearly show that using the proposed scheme in sensor networks with MS performs much 
better than the Q-composite scheme, the polynomial pool-based scheme, and the scheme 
in [48]. In the proposed scheme, each sensor node has to store k generation keys and s 
polynomials each of degree t. We assume that each generation key take the same storage 
overhead as the coefficients of a polynomial. 
 
2. Communication Overhead 
 
According to our pervious discussion, a mobile sink can establish a pairwise key and a 
common polynomial. If the MS and the sensor node i fails to establish a pairwise direct-
ly since the two don’t share a common polynomial but share a common generation key. 
Then the MS and the sensor node i need to find at least one common neighbor that share 
a common polynomial with MS and a common polynomial with the sensor node i. In 
this section we investigate the smallest number of hops required by a sensor node to be 
securely connected to MS. Our analytical approach is similar to that given in [34], [52]. 
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Fig. 3. Fraction of compromised data links between non-compromised sensors with dif-
ferent connectivity. PS and GK refer to our scheme and the probabilistic generation key 
pre-distribution scheme respectively. Assume MS and each sensor node has available 
storage for up to 600 keys, 210 keys respectively 
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Let ph(x) be the probability that the smallest number of hops required to establish 
a pairwise key between a MS and a sensor node i is z. The probability ph(1) is obviously 
equal to pc when the MS and the sensor node i can establish pairwise key directly. In the 
case where the MS and the sensor node i can’t establish a pairwise key directly, the 
probability ph(2), the common neighbor connecting the MS and the sensor node i must 
be in the overlap area of the communication range of MS and the sensor node i, as 
shown in Fig. 4. 
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In our analysis, we assume that R, r represents the communication range of the 
MS and each sensor node respectively, where R ≥ r. x is the distance between the MS 
and the sensor node i. The overlap area is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total number of sensor nodes in the overlap area can be estimated as 
(2.8) 
where n is the number of sensor node within the communication range of a sensor. 
The probability distribution function of the distance between the MS and a sensor 
node within communication range r is given by F(x) = P(distance ≤ x) = x2/ . The 
probability density function is thus 
 
 
We then calculate the probability ph(2, x) that a MS and a sensor node i can’t es-
tablish a pairwise key directly and there exist at least one common node in the overlap 
area that share a common polynomial with the MS and a common polynomial with the 
sensor node i to help establish a pairwise key between MS and the sensor node i. given 
the distance between MS and the sensor node i is x.  
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ph(2, x) = (1 – pc )(1 – pi(x) ), where pi(x) represent the probability that no common node 
in the overlap area is exist that share a common polynomial with MS and a common po-
lynomial with the sensor node i given that MS and node i can’t establish a pairwise key 
directly. By taking the average of ph(2, x) through all the possible values of x, the proba-
bility ph(2) can be calculated as: 
ph(2)=ph,1(2)+ph,2(2), where ph,1(2), ph,2(2) are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where 
 
 
               
(2.9) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5, Fig. 6 & Fig. 7 plots the values of ph(1) and ph(2). These figures clearly 
shows that MS can establish pairwise key with a sensor node with a probability equal to   
 , )(21)1(
,),2()()2(
)(21)1(
0,),2()()2(
2,22
2,
0
.
2,22
0
1,
2


 



 









dxp
r
xp
rxrRdxxpxfp
dxp
r
xp
rRxdxxpxfp
a
r
rR
c
r
rR
h
rR
r
c
rR
h

22,2 ||
2||||
2
||||
1










 


 





 

s
S
s
sS
s
sS
s
S
s
sS
p
p
pppp
))()()((
2
1
2
cos
2
cos
222
12
222
122
RrxRrxRrxRrx
xR
Rrx
R
xr
xRrx
rra




 


  
  
27
 
R = r =20m
R = r =29m
R = r =39m
Fig. 5. The probability that a MS can establish a pairwise key with a sensor node with at 
most two hops with node density (n = 30), various mobile sink communication range (R) 
and a polynomial pool size (|Sp| = 40)
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R = r =39m
R = r =20m
Fig. 6. The probability that a MS can establish a pairwise key with a sensor node with at 
most two hops with node density (n = 60), various mobile sink communication range (R) 
and a polynomial pool size (|Sp| = 40)
R = r =29m
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R = r =20m
R = r =29m
R = r =39m
Fig. 7. The probability that a MS can establish a pairwise key with a sensor node with at 
most two hops with node density (n = 120), various mobile sink communication range 
(R) and a polynomial pool size (|Sp| = 40)
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 unity, since ph(1)+ph(2) ≈ 1 when s is large. 
 
3. Memory Overhead 
 
According to our scheme, each sensor node has to store k generation keys and s polyno-
mials each of degree t. We assume that each generation key take the same storage over-
head as the coefficients of a polynomial. Thus, the storage overhead is (s×(t+1)+k) log λ, 
where k in the range of 2 to 5.  
 
D. Q-COMPOSITE GENERATION KEY SCHEME COMBINED WITH THE PO-
LYNOMIAL POOL-BASED SCHEME 
 
The operation of this scheme is similar to that of the previously proposed scheme, differ-
ing only in the amount of generation keys overlap that are used to establish secure com-
munications instead of just one.  
This scheme is based on the Q-composite scheme [34] and polynomial pool-
based scheme [35] to establish pairwise keys. As it was describe in the previous section, 
a sensor node and MS can establish a pairwise key if the two share a single common 
generation key and a common polynomial in their key and polynomial rings. However, 
in this scheme, we increases the amount of generation keys overlap along with a com-
mon shared polynomial between MS and a sensor node that are required for key-setup. A 
Q common generation keys (Q > 1) and a common shared polynomial are needed, in-
stead of just one generation key and one common polynomial. By increasing the amount 
of common generation keys, we increase the resilience of the network against nodes cap-
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ture. 
     The proposed scheme is different from the Q-composite scheme. In the Q-
composite scheme, to preserve a given probability of connection between two sensor 
nodes that share Q common keys to establish a secure link, it is necessary to reduce the 
size of the key pool. However, in our scheme the probability of connectivity is being 
preserved (q = 0.99), since the MS is initially pre-loaded with large number of genera-
tion keys (m >> k ) and it is grantee to find at least Q common generation keys with a 
sensor node. 
 
1. Security Analysis 
 
Similar to the security analysis that was described in section C, we drive the probability 
of a data communication link between MS and any non-compromised sensor node being 
compromised. This probability can be estimated by  
 
(2.10) 
 
We further compare the proposed scheme with the Q-composite scheme [34] and 
the polynomial pool-based scheme [35]. Fig. 8 shows that the proposed scheme per-
formed butter in terms of network resilience to nodes capture compared to our previous-
ly proposed scheme (Q = 1), the Q-composite scheme and the polynomial pool-based 
scheme. 
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 Fig. 8. Fraction of compromised data links between non-compromised sensors with dif-
ferent connectivity. QS and GK refer to our scheme and the probabilistic generation key 
pre-distribution scheme respectively
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E. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, we developed two key pre-distribution schemes for sensor network with 
mobile sink. The two proposed schemes are based on the polynomial pool-based scheme 
[35], the probabilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme [48], and the Q-composite 
scheme [34]. We show that both schemes have the threshold property, i.e., they remain 
perfectly secure up to the capture of a certain fraction of sensor nodes. Security analyses 
indicate that the proposed schemes provide a higher probability for non-compromised 
sensors to establish a secure communication with the mobile sink than previous schemes 
[35], [34], [48]. The schemes also provide both security and MS connectivity as the op-
timization criteria. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANTI MOBILE SINK REPLICATION ATTACK SCHEMES 
 
The problem of authentication and pairwise key establishment in sensor networks with 
MSs is still not solved in the face of mobile sink replication attacks. For the basic proba-
bilistic [32] and Q-composite [34] key pre-distribution schemes, an attacker can easily 
obtain large number of keys by capturing a small fraction of the network sensor nodes, 
making it possible for the attacker to take control of the entire network by deploying a 
replicated mobile sink pre-loaded with some compromised keys to authenticate and then 
initiate data communication with any sensor node. 
To address the above problem, we developed a general framework [41], [42] that 
permits the use of any pairwise key pre-distribution scheme as its basic component to 
provide authentication and pairwise key establishment between sensor nodes and MSs. 
To facilitate the study of a new security technique, we first cultivated a general three-tier 
security framework for authentication and pairwise key establishment based on the poly-
nomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme [35]. The proposed technique will sub-
stantially improve network resilience to mobile sink replication attacks compared with 
the single polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution approach [35], as an attacker 
would have to compromise many more sensor nodes to launch a successful mobile sink-
replication attack. In the new security framework [41], [42], a small fraction of pre-
selected sensors (see Fig. 9), called the stationary access nodes, act as authentication 
access points to the network and to trigger sensor nodes to transmit their aggregated data  
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to mobile sinks. A mobile sink sends data request messages to sensor nodes via a statio-
nary access node, these mobile sink’s data request messages will initiate the stationary 
access node to trigger sensor nodes to transmit their data to the requested mobile sink. 
The scheme uses two separate polynomial pools: the mobile polynomial pool and the 
static polynomial pool. The mobile Polynomial pool is used for authentication and keys 
setup between mobile sinks and stationary access nodes. From this pool, each mobile 
sink randomly selects a subset of Km mobile polynomials out of |M| mobile polynomials, 
and each stationary access node randomly selects a single mobile polynomial. 
The static polynomial pool is used for authentication and pairwise key establish-
ment between sensor nodes and stationary access nodes. From this pool, each sensor 
Access points 
Sensors 
 
Mobile Sinks 
Fig. 9. The three-tier security scheme in WSN with mobile sinks 
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node randomly selects a subset of Ks static polynomials out of |S| static polynomials. 
Each stationary access node randomly selects a subset of Ks-1 static polynomials.  
Using two separate key pools and have few sensor nodes that carry keys from the 
mobile key pool will made it more difficult for the attacker to launch a mobile sink repli-
cation attack on the sensor network by capturing only a few arbitrary sensor nodes. Ra-
ther, the attacker would also have to capture sensor nodes that carry keys from the mo-
bile key pool. Keys from the mobile key pool are used mainly for mobile sink authenti-
cation and hence to gain access to the network for data gathering.  
Although the above security approach makes the network more resilient to mo-
bile sink replication attack compared with the single polynomial pool-based key pre-
distribution scheme [35], it is still vulnerable to stationary access nodes replication at-
tacks. In this type of attack, the attacker is able to launch a replication attack similar to 
the mobile sink replication attack. After a fraction of sensor nodes have been compro-
mised by an adversary, captured static polynomials can be loaded into a replicated sta-
tionary access node that transmits recorded mobile sink’s data request messages to trig-
ger sensor nodes to send their aggregated data.   
To make the three-tier security scheme more robust against stationary access 
node replication attack, we strengthen the authentication mechanism between the statio-
nary access nodes and sensor nodes using one-way hash chains algorithm [53] in con-
junction with the static polynomial pool-based scheme [35]. 
Our analytical results indicate that the new security technique makes the network 
more resilient to both mobile sink replication attacks and stationary access nodes replic- 
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 ation attacks compared with the single polynomial pool-based approach. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section A presents our proposed scheme 
and its security performance against mobile sink replication attack [41], [42]. Section B 
shows the security analysis and the threat analysis for stationary access nodes replica-
tion attack for the enhanced three-tire scheme, and Section C draws conclusions. 
 
A. THE THREE-TIER SECURITY SCHEME 
 
In this work, we choose the Blundo scheme [38] to construct our approach. As we shall 
see, the Blundo scheme provides a clear security guarantee. Use of the Blundo scheme, 
therefore, greatly eases the presentation of our work and enables us to provide a clearer 
security analysis. 
The Blundo scheme, when applied to ad hoc or sensor network usually involves 
the following steps. 
 The base station (or a key setup server) chooses a random symmetric bivariate 
polynomial f (x, y) of degree t with coefficients over a finite field GF (q), where q 
is a prime number large enough to accommodate a symmetric key. 
 f (x,y) = 

t
tji
ji
ij yxa
,0
       (3.1) 
 The base station loads every sensor node u with f (u, y), which is a polynomial 
obtained by evaluating f (x, y) at x = u. 
f (u,y) = 

t
tji
ji
ij yua
,0
        (3.2) 
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 If two nodes, u and v, want to set up a pairwise key, each evaluates the others’ id 
in its own polynomial. The result f (u, v) = f (v, u) serves as their pairwise key. 
In the proposed scheme, we use two separate polynomial pools: the mobile poly-
nomial pool and the static polynomial pool. Polynomials from the mobile polynomial 
pool are used to establish authentication between mobile sinks and stationary access 
nodes that will enable these mobile sinks to access the sensor network for data gathering. 
Thus, an attacker would need to compromise at least a single polynomial from the mo-
bile pool to gain access to the network for sensor’s data gathering. Polynomials from the 
static polynomial pool are used to ascertain authentication and keys setup between sen-
sor nodes and stationary access nodes (see Fig. 10).   
Prior to deployment, each mobile sink randomly picks a subset of polynomials 
from the mobile polynomial pool. In our scheme, to improve the network resilience to 
mobile sink replication attack as compared to the single polynomial pool-based ap-
proach, we intend to minimize the probability of a mobile polynomial being compro-
mised if Rc sensor nodes were captured. Since an adversary can use the captured mobile 
polynomial to launch a mobile sink replication attack, we achieve this by having a small 
fraction of sensor nodes randomly selected to carry a polynomial from the mobile poly-
nomial pool. These pre-selected sensor nodes are called the stationary access nodes. 
They act as authentication access points for the network and trigger sensor nodes to tran- 
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Fig. 10. Wireless sensor network with mobile sinks and sensor nodes using two separate 
key pools for key pre-distribution 
 
 
smit their aggregated data to mobile sinks. A mobile sink sends data request messages to 
sensor nodes via a stationary access node. These mobile sink’s data request messages 
will initiate the stationary access node to trigger sensor nodes to transmit their aggre-
gated data to the requested sink. Each stationary access node may share a mobile poly-
nomial with a mobile sink. All sensor nodes, including the stationary access nodes, ran-
domly select a subset of polynomials from the static polynomial pool. The advantage of 
using separate pools is that mobile sink authentication is independent of the key distribu-
tion scheme used to connect the sensor network. We divide our scheme into two stages: 
static and mobile polynomial pre-distribution and key discovery between a mobile sink 
and a sensor node. 
          Stationary node            Stationary access node     Mobile sink 
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  Stage 1: Static and mobile polynomial pre-distribution: Stage 1 is performed be-
fore nodes are deployed. A mobile polynomial pool M of size |M| and a static polynomi-
al pool S of size |S| are generated along with the polynomial identifiers. All mobile sinks 
and stationary access nodes are randomly given Km and one polynomial (Km > 1) from 
M. The number of mobile polynomials in every mobile sink is more than the number of 
mobile polynomials in every stationary access node. This assures that a mobile node 
shares a common mobile polynomial with a stationary access node with high probability 
and reduces the number of compromised mobile polynomials when stationary access 
nodes are captured. All sensor nodes and the pre-selected stationary access nodes ran-
domly pick a subset of Ks and Ks-1 polynomials from S. Fig. 11 shows key discovery 
between mobile node and stationary node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) 
 v    a  
   u 
   u 
   i 
  a   v 
(c) 
   u 
  a 
  i 
   v 
Sensor’s u 
neighborhood 
          Stationary node                 Stationary access node            Mobile sink 
Fig. 11. (a) Direct key discovery, (b) Indirect key discovery through intermediate statio-
nary node i, (c) Indirect key discovery through intermediate stationary access node i
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Stage 2: Key discovery between mobile node and stationary node: To establish a direct 
pairwise key between sensor node u and mobile sink v, a sensor node u needs to find a 
stationary access node a in its neighborhood, such that node a can establish pairwise 
keys with both mobile sink v and sensor node u. In other words, a stationary access node 
needs to establish pairwise keys with both a mobile sink and a sensor node. It has to find 
a common mobile polynomial with the mobile sink and a common static polynomial 
with the sensor node. To discover a common mobile/static polynomial, a sensor node i 
may broadcast a list of polynomial IDs, or alternatively, an encryption list , EKv ( ), v = 
1, …|Ksi|, where Kv is a potential pairwise key the other node may have as suggested in 
[36], [37]. When a direct secure path is established between nodes u and v, mobile sink v 
sends the pairwise key Kc to node a in a message encrypted and authenticated with the 
shared pairwise key Kv,a between v and a. If node a receives the above message and it 
shares a pairwise key with u, it sends the pairwise key Kc to node u in a message en-
crypted and authenticated with pairwise key Ka,u between a and u.  
  If the direct key establishment fails, the mobile sink and the sensor node will 
have to establish a pairwise key with the help of other sensor nodes. To establish a pair-
wise key with mobile sink v, a sensor node u has to find a stationary access node a in its 
neighborhood such that node a can establish pairwise key with both node u and v. If 
node a established a pairwise key with node v only and not with u. Since the probability 
is high that stationary access node a can discover a common mobile polynomial with 
node v, sensor node u needs to find an intermediate sensor node i along the path u-i-a–v, 
such that intermediate node i can establish a direct pairwise key with node a.  
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1. Security analysis 
 
We analyze the performance of the proposed scheme using two metrics: security and 
connectivity. For security, we present the probability of a mobile polynomial being 
compromised; hence an attacker can make use of the captured mobile polynomial to 
launch a mobile sink replication attack against the sensor network. In connectivity, we 
estimate the probability of a mobile sink establishing secure links with sensor nodes 
from any authentication access point in the network. Clearly, for a densely deployed 
network of n nodes, if a sensor node cannot find any stationary access node in its neigh-
borhood, it cannot connect securely to any mobile sink. Thus, we want to ensure that a 
sensor has at least one stationary access node in its neighborhood with a high probability 
of connectivity. A critical parameter is the number m of stationary access nodes in the 
network. For simplicity, we assume that sensor nodes are evenly deployed in the field. 
Let c be the average number of neighbor nodes for every sensor node before the dep-
loyment of stationary access nodes. 
  After the stationary access nodes are evenly deployed in the network, the proba-
bility that a sensor node cannot find any stationary access node in its neighborhood can 
be estimated by (1- n
c )m. The probability that a sensor node has at least one stationary 
access node in its neighborhood can be estimated by 
   mncconnP  11        (3.3) 
In the dense sensor network, we can usually deploy a small fraction of sensor nodes that 
carry a mobile polynomial, such that any sensor node can find at least one stationary ac- 
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Fig. 12. The probability Pconn that a sensor has at least one stationary access node in its 
neighborhood vs. the ratio of stationary access nodes 
 
 
 
 
cess node in its neighborhood with high probability. For example, when c = 60, we need 
to have 8% of the sensor nodes deployed carrying a mobile polynomial to ensure that a 
node can find at least one stationary access node in its neighborhood with probability 
0.99. Fig. 12 shows Pconn vs. the ratio of stationary access nodes. 
The probability that a mobile sink and a stationary access node share a mobile 
polynomial—in other words, the probability Pm that mobile sink and stationary access 
node can establish a key directly—is expressed by 
  Pm = ||M
K m
         (3.4) 
The probability Ps that two sensor nodes share a common static polynomial the proba-
bility that the two sensors can establish a secure link directly can be estimated in equa-
tion (3.5). 
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  The probability Psa, that a sensor node and a stationary access node sharing a 
common static polynomial—the probability that the two nodes can establish a pairwise 
key directly—is estimated by 
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  The probability Pa, that two stationary access nodes sharing a common stat-
ic/mobile polynomial, can be estimated by 
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  Fig. 13 show the relationship between the probability Psa and the combination of 
|S| and Ks, respectively. Fig. 14 shows the probability Pa with various combinations of 
|S|, Ks and |M|. 
  All figures clearly show that the closer |S| and Ks are, the more likely two sensor 
nodes can establish a pairwise key directly. 
  Now let us consider the probability that a mobile sink v can establish a pairwise 
key with a sensor node u through direct or indirect key discovery. Let d denote the aver-
age number of stationary neighbors that static node u can contact. Let g denote the aver-
age number of stationary access nodes node u has in its neighborhood, through which u 
can contact a mobile node v. Considering any of these g stationary access nodes, the 
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probability that it shares a mobile polynomial with the sink v and share a static poly-
nomial with the node u is PsaPm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. The probability Psa that a sensor and stationary access node share a static poly-
nomial vs. the size |S|
Fig. 14. The probability Pa , that two sensors share a static or a mobile polynomial vs. 
the size |S|
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   The probability that mobile sink v cannot establish a pairwise key directly with 
node u can be estimated by (1- PsaPm)g. Considering that any of node u neighbors acts as 
an intermediate node, the probability that node u cannot establish a pairwise key indi-
rectly with mobile sink v is (1- PmPsaPs)g.d. In the case that any stationary access neigh-
bors of node u acts as an intermediate node, the probability that node u cannot establish a 
pairwise key indirectly with sink v is (1- PmPaPsa)g(g -1) . The probability Pd of a mobile 
sink and a sensor node establishing a pairwise key (directly or indirectly) can be esti-
mated by 
  Pd = 1- (1- PsaPm)g . (1- PmPsaPs)g.d . (1- PmPaPsa)g(g -1) . 
  Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the relationship between Pd vs. d and the combinations 
of g and Pm respectively. 
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Fig. 15. The probability Pd of a mobile sink establishing a pairwise key with a sensor 
node vs. the number of sensor neighbors d 
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Fig. 16. The probability Pd of a mobile sink establishing a pairwise key with a sensor 
node 
 
 
2. Threat analysis 
 
In this section, we analyze the security performance of the proposed scheme against mo-
bile sink replication attack. As stated in the previous section, in order for an attacker to 
  
48
launch a mobile sink replication attack on the network, the adversary has to compromise 
at least one polynomial from the mobile polynomial pool. To achieve this, the adversary 
must capture at least a specific number of stationary access nodes that hold the same 
mobile polynomial.  
  As we described earlier, a small number of m stationary access nodes are ran-
domly being picked out of n sensor nodes in the network. Every stationary access node 
is assigned a mobile polynomial that may be randomly chosen from the mobile poly-
nomial pool. It follows from the security analysis of the Blundo scheme, that for any po-
lynomial w in the mobile polynomial pool of degree tm, an attacker cannot recover poly-
nomial w, if no more than tm stationary access nodes that had chosen w are captured by 
the attacker. If more than tm stationary access nodes with w as their mobile polynomial 
are captured by the attacker, then the attacker can recover the mobile polynomial w, and 
hence be able to launch a mobile sink replication attack against the sensor network. We 
assume an attacker randomly captures Rc sensor nodes, Rc > tm. Consider any polynomial 
w in the mobile polynomial pool. The probability of w being chosen for a stationary 
access node is
||
1
M
, the probability that any captured node is a stationary access node is 
n
m , and the probability that this polynomial being chosen exactly by x stationary access 
nodes among Rc captured nodes is  
     xRnmMxnmMc cxRxP 


 || 1|| 1 1)(       (3.8) 
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Thus, the probability that any polynomial from the mobile polynomial pool being  re-
covered by an  attacker is                                               . Fig. 17 shows the probability  Pr  
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Fig. 17. The probability Pr that any polynomial from the mobile polynomial pool is be-
ing recovered 
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when two separate polynomial pools are used for mobile sink and sensor nodes and 
compares it with the case of a single polynomial pool approach being used for both sen-
sor nodes and mobile sinks. The figure clearly shows that an attacker must capture many 
more sensor nodes in this scheme than in the single polynomial pool approach. 
 
B. THE ENHANCED THREE-TIER SECURITY SCHEME 
 
As described in the previous section, the three-tier security scheme provides better net-
work resilience against mobile sink replication attack compared with the single poly-
nomial pool approach. This scheme delivers the same security performance as the single 
polynomial pool approach when network is being under a stationary access node repli-
cation attack. In both schemes, for any sensor node u that need to authenticate and estab-
lish a pairwise key with a stationary access node A, the two nodes must share at least a 
common polynomial in their polynomial rings. To perform a stationary access node rep-
lication attack on a network, the adversary needs to compromise at least a single poly-
nomial from the static pool. This can be obtained easily by capturing arbitrary sensor 
nodes in the network. Then the adversary can make use of this compromised polynomial 
by a replicated stationary access node to enable insecure access to the network. When 
successful access to the network has been obtained through the compromised static po-
lynomial, the replicated stationary access node transmits recorded mobile sink data re-
quest messages. Then sensor nodes that have the compromised polynomial in their rings 
will insecurely authenticate and establish a pairwise key with the replicated node and 
hence deliver their data to the replicated node.  
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In this section, we remedy the security performance of the proposed scheme in 
the case of stationary access node replication attack. We use a one-way hash chain [53] 
algorithm in conjunction with the polynomial pool scheme. In addition to the static po-
lynomial, a pool of randomly generated passwords is used to enhance authentication be-
tween sensor nodes and stationary access nodes. 
In the enhanced security scheme, each sensor node, such as u, is pre-loaded with 
a subset of Ks polynomials randomly chosen from the static pool |S|. In addition to the Ks 
preloaded static polynomials, node u randomly picks a subset of Gs passwords form the 
password pool |W|. Then for each of the Gs password Pwi that was randomly chosen by 
node u, its rth hash value, rH (Pwi) is loaded into node u. Each password is blinded with 
the use of a collision-resistant hash function such as MD5 [54]. Due to the collision-
resistant property, it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to find a value Pwx, 
such that H(Pwy) = H(Pwx), Pwx   Pwy. For stationary access nodes, each is pre-loaded 
with Ks-1 static polynomials and Ga hash values ( 1rH (Pwi)) for the randomly chosen 
passwords from the pool |W|.  
To establish authentication between a sensor node and a stationary access node 
in the enhanced scheme, the two must share a common static polynomial. Also, they 
need to discover at least a single access node verification of H ( 1rH (Pwi)) = rH (Pwi) 
for which both the sensor node and the stationary access node had the same password 
Pwi randomly chosen from the pool |W|. In the access node verification, to verify the au-
thentcy of a stationary access node, the sensor node performs a single hash operation on 
the hash value that sent from the stationary access node.  
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1. Security analysis 
 
Similar to the security analysis presented in section A, we evaluate the performance of 
the enhanced three-tier security scheme in terms of connectivity. We estimated the prob-
ability Pconn that a sensor node has at least one stationary access node in its neighbor-
hood, verified by H ( 1rH (Pwi)) = rH (Pwi), where 1rH (Pwi) and rH (Pwi) are the pre-
loaded hash values of Pwi in each of the stationary access node and the sensor node, re-
spectively.  Thus, 
 mncconn pP  11        (3.9) 
where p is the probability that a stationary access node and a sensor share at least a 
common chosen password for access node verification. 










 




Ga
W
Gs
W
Gs
GaGs
GaGs
W
p ||||
||
1        (3.10) 
For different node densities c =10, c =20, c =60, and c = 120, Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 
shows the probability Pconn vs. the ratio of stationary access nodes and the probability p. 
All figures clearly indicate that for a given stationary access node ratio of α, and a node 
density c, the probability of connectivity increases as p increases.  
We also estimated the probability Pg (Fig. 20) of a mobile sink being connected 
directly or indirectly to a sensor node via a stationary access node that share with sensor 
node at least a common static polynomial and a common chosen password Pwi for which 
the node is able to verify the access node by (H ( 1rH (Pwi)) = rH (Pwi)). To drive the 
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probability Pg, we use a similar analysis to the estimation of the probability Pd except 
that no sensor neighbor can act as intermediate node, thus Pg can be estimated in (3.11).  
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 18. The probability Pconn for various node density vs. the ratio of stationary access 
nodes and the probability p that a sensor and a stationary access node share at least a 
common chosen password ( c = 10 and c = 20) 
 
              (b) 
(a) 
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Fig. 19. The probability Pconn for various node density vs. the ratio of stationary 
access nodes and the probability p that a sensor and a stationary access node share at 
least a common chosen password ( c = 60 and c = 120) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Fig. 20. The probability Pg under given probabilities of Psa, Pa, Pm, and p 
vs. the average number of stationary access nodes g in a sensor neighborhood 
 
 
 
 
Pg = 1- (1- pPsaPm)g . (1- pPmPaPsa)g(g -1)       (3.11) 
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2. Threat analysis 
 
In the stationary access node replication attack, the adversary needs to capture at least 
one polynomial from the static pool and at least one hash value Hr-1 ( ) of a chosen pass-
word. To analyze the security performance of the enhanced three-tier scheme, we esti-
mated the probability Php of non-compromised sensor node being under a stationary 
access node replication attack when x number of nodes is being captured. In order to 
calculate the probability Php for a non-compromised sensor node that’s had a hash value 
Hr(Pwi) in its hash value ring and static polynomial y in its static polynomial ring, we 
required to obtain the probabilities of both that Hr-1 (Pwi) and polynomial y are being 
compromised when x nodes is captured. 
The probability Ph that a given hash value is not chosen by a non-compromised 
stationary access node is
n
m
W
Ga 
||
1 . If there are x compromised nodes, the probability 
that a given hash value Hr-1(Pwi) is not captured is (
n
m
W
Ga 
||
1  )x. The probability of 
the hash value being captured is thus 
x
h n
m
W
GaP 

  ||11        
(3.12)                          
Fig. 21 shows the probability of a hash value Hr-1( ) being compromised vs. the 
number of captured nodes. From these figures we observed that, the probability Ph in-
creases dramatically as we increase the ratio of stationary access nodes n
m  from 1% to  
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8%. In the case of the captured static polynomial y of degree t, the attacker cannot de-
termine the non-compromised static polynomial-based key if he/she has captured no 
Fig. 21. The probability Ph of hash value being compromised vs. the number of com-
promised nodes under different stationary access nodes ratio n
m  
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more than t nodes. Similar to the analysis in [35], let us assume the case where the num-
ber of compromised sensors x > t. The probability of any polynomial being chosen for a 
sensor node is || S
Ks , and the probability of this polynomial being chosen exactly j times 
among x nodes is  
jx
s
j
s
S
K
S
K
j
x
jP



 




 ||1||)(     
(3.13) 
Thus the probability of polynomial y being compromised is  



tj
j
p jpP
0
)(1
       
(3.14) 
      From equations (3.12) and (3.14) the probability Php that a non-compromised 
sensor node is under a stationary access node replication attack is thus can be estimated 
by 


 

 


  

xtj
j
hp n
m
W
GajpP
||
11)(1
0      
(3.15) 
Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 show the probability Php of non-compromised sensor node being un-
der a stationary access node replication attack. The figures clearly indicate that for low 
fraction of stationary access node ( n
m  = 0.01 , n
m  = 0.02) the enhanced three-tier secu-
rity scheme has a butter security performance in terms of network resilience to statio-
nary access node replication attack as compared to the previously proposed three-tier 
scheme. For stationary access node ratio greater than 2%, both versions of the three-tier 
Security scheme have similar resiliency against stationary access node replication attack  
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Fig. 22. The probability Php of a non-compromised sensor node being under a stationary 
access node replication attack ( Psa = 0.33 ) 
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Fig. 23. The probability Php of a non-compromised sensor node being under a stationary 
access node replication attack ( Psa = 0.5 ) 
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C. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, we proposed a general three-tier security framework for authentication 
and pairwise key establishment between mobile sinks and sensor nodes. The proposed 
scheme is based on the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme, it substan-
tially improve network resilience to mobile sink replication attacks compared with the 
single polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution approach [35]. In this scheme, a small 
fraction of pre-selected sensor nodes, called the stationary access nodes, acts as authen-
tication access points to the sensor network, the scheme uses separate polynomial pools: 
The mobile polynomial pool and the static polynomial pool. The mobile polynomial pool 
is used for authentication and keys setup between mobile sinks and stationary access 
nodes. The static polynomial pool is used for authentication and pairwise key establish-
ment between sensor nodes and stationary access nodes. Mobile sinks use the stationary 
access nodes to establish secure communications links with sensor nodes. Using two 
separate key pools and having few stationary access nodes carrying polynomial from the 
mobile pool in the network made harder for an attacker to gather sensors data by deploy-
ing a replicated mobile sink. Analysis indicates that with 10% of the sensor nodes in the 
network carrying a polynomial from the mobile pool, for any mobile polynomial to be 
recovered, the attacker would have to capture 20.8 times more nodes as compared to the 
single polynomial pool approach. We further improve the security performance of the 
proposed scheme against stationary access node replication attack by strengthen the au-
thentication mechanism between stationary access nodes and sensor nodes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANTI WORMHOLE ATTACK SCHEMES IN SENSOR NETWORKS 
WITH A CONTROL MOBILTY-SINK 
 
The use of mobile sinks in WSN introduces a new security challenge. Fig. 24(a) shows a 
wireless sensor network with one mobile sink and a base station. Sensor nodes store the 
generated data in their buffers. The mobile sink traverses the network using random 
walk, periodically transmitting beacon signals. Sensor nodes that hear the mobile sink’s 
beacon transmission begin transferring their aggregated data to the mobile sink. Since 
the mobile sink’s beacon signal received by sensor nodes is not authenticated, an adver-
sary can attack the network by placing a malicious mobile sink. As shown in Fig. 24(b), 
the malicious mobile sink begins transmitting beacon signals. Nodes that hear the malici- 
 
 
    BS
Malicious static node                Malicious mobile sink                 Trusted mobile sink    
(a)       (b) 
Fig. 24. (a) sensor network with a mobile sink. The mobile sink traversing the network 
randomly to collect sensors data. (b) Wireless sensor network with a malicious MS
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Fig. 25. Wormhole-HELLO flood attack 
 
 
 
 
 
ous beacon sink will transmit their aggregated data to the malicious sink. The attacker 
can also launch a wormhole-HELLO flood attack by placing multiple malicious nodes 
capable of short-range communications and one with a powerful transmission range. 
When a short-range malicious node hears the mobile sink beacon, it tunnels the beacon 
signal over a secret communication channel to a high-range malicious node, which 
broadcasts the mobile sink beacon signal over the entire network, causing nodes that are 
not within the mobile sink’s communication range to transmit their aggregated data, as 
shown in Fig. 25.  Fig. 26 illustrates a different type of attack on a network that uses a 
controlled mobile sink to collect data. The mobile sink uses a deterministic communica-
tion path to collect sensor data from nodes that rely on the mobile sink’s communication 
path. An attacker can launch a wormhole-sinkhole  attack  by having a  number  of  static 
   BS 
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Fig. 26. Wormhole-Sinkhole attack 
 
 
malicious nodes placed within the trusted mobile sink’s communication path and one 
malicious mobile sink that moves along the trusted communication path. When a static 
malicious node hears the trusted sink’s beacon signal, it tunnels the beacon message 
through a secret channel to a malicious mobile sink. The malicious mobile sink replays 
the beacon signal on different part of the network, causing nodes to transmit their aggre-
gated data to the malicious mobile sink. 
Another type of a wormhole attack is shown in Fig. 27. The attacker places a ma-
licious node within the trusted mobile sink’s communication path. The trusted sink 
moves along the communication path transmitting beacon signals. When it visits an at-
tacker node, the attacker node records the trusted mobile sink’s beacon and replays it ba- 
 
    BS 
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Fig. 27. Wormhole attack 
 
 
ck at a different time. This will cause nodes within the attacker’s communication range 
to transmit their aggregated data to the malicious node. 
This chapter proposes a novel countermeasure attack for sensor networks with 
controlled mobility. The proposed security mechanism does not apply to sensor net-
works that use a mobile sink with random walk to gather sensors data. Since sensors are 
hardware- and power-limited, we consider computationally efficient methods, such as 
the use of an efficient hash function, to prevent attacks on the network. The proposed 
security mechanism uses a collision-resistant hash function, such as MD5 [54], to au-
thenticate the source of the beacon signal before sensor nodes are allowed to transmit 
  BS 
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their aggregated data to the trusted mobile sink. Our defense method is able to eliminate 
or minimize the effect of the threat models discussed earlier. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section A describe the network 
architecture. Section B presents the anti-threat system model. Section C presents the 
threat analysis. Section D & E show security performance and simulation evaluation for 
the proposed technique. Section F concludes the chapter and points out some future re-
search direction. 
 
A. NETWORK AND SECURITY MECHANISM 
 
1. Node and network assumption 
 
We assume regular stationary sensor nodes are constrained in resources, and the mobile 
sink moves along a fixed path to gather sensor data. We assume that every sensor node 
has space to store several hundred bytes of keying information. Sensor nodes are not 
synchronized. A mobile sink can be as powerful as a laptop-class device or a PDA. Mo-
bile sink and sensor nodes have the same communication range R. The mobile sink’s 
communication path (see Fig. 28) is divided into x
L grids or cells, where L is the length 
of mobile sink’s communication path and x is the cell length. In our system model, we 
assume R > x. A base station is located in a fixed and secure location. We assume that 
the base station and the mobile sink cannot be compromised. 
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2. Key establishing and hash values distribution schemes 
 
A sensor node encrypts its data using a pre-loaded individual key shared with the base 
station. The base station generates a master key Km , from which it derives an indi- 
 
 
 
 
 
vidual key for every node u as Ku = GKm (u), where G is a pseudo-random function [55]. 
Sensor nodes send their encrypted messages to the mobile sink. Since the mobile sink 
does not carry individual key information for each sensor, it cannot decrypt sensors mes-
sages. The mobile sink carries the sensor’s encrypted message to the base station. Hence, 
given an encrypted sensor message [{m}Ku , u], u is the node ID, and {m}k denotes the 
encryption of message m with key k, the base station can compute its pairwise key with a 
sensor whenever needed, without having to store any pairwise keys.  
Initially, the base station dispatches the mobile sink to distribute initial hash val-
ues information among sensor nodes. To prevent a malicious node from injecting false 
hash values information into the network during the hash values distribution phase, we 
R 
B
      x 
Mobile sink’s communication path length: L  
 
Nodes occupies the same cell i share an 
initial hash value H n (PWi), in which it’s 
assigned by the mobile sink 
Fig. 28. Key distribution scheme 
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require sensors to authenticate the source of the beacons using collision-resistant hash 
functions.  
We use the following scheme based on efficient one-way hash chains [53] to 
provide the mobile sink’s beacon authentication [56], [57]. The mobile sink is pre-
loaded with a global password PWG and a table containing a unique password PWj for 
each cell j in the mobile sink’s communication path. As shown in Fig. 28, in a sensor 
network with a communication path of length L and cell of length x, the mobile sink is 
pre-loaded with L/x unique passwords. Passwords are blinded with the use of a collision-
resistant hash function such as MD5 [54]. Due to the collision-resistant property, it is 
computationally infeasible for an attacker to find a value PWx, such that H(PWy) = 
H(PWx), PWx   PWy. The hash sequence generated for sensors in cell j uses the follow-
ing equation: 
H 0 = PWj , H i  = H ( H i - 1 ) ,  i= 1, 2,. . . n 
with n being a large number and H 0  never revealed to any sensor in cell j. Each sensor 
node is pre-loaded with a hash value H n (PWG). During the key distribution phase, the 
mobile sink moves along a deterministic path transmitting beacon messages which con-
tain hash value information. For example, when the mobile sink is within cell j, it trans-
mits a beacon message with the following format: 
( H n - 1 (PWG )) || (H n (PWj )), 
Initially, sensor nodes in cell j only know the hash value H n (PWG). The mobile sink in-
cludes H n - 1 (PWG) and the corresponding initial hash value for nodes within cell j. Every 
sensor node in cell j that receives the mobile sink’s beacon can authenticate the source of 
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the beacon transmission if H (H n - 1 (PWG))=H n (PWG). After verification, sensors in cell 
j replace H n (PWG) with H n - 1 (PWG) in their memory and each node is assigned the same 
initial hash value H n (PWj). 
 
B. PROPOSED SECURITY SCHEME 
 
Since the proposed security mechanism prevents sensor nodes from sending their aggre-
gated data to a malicious beacon node, we consider mobile sink’s beacon authentication. 
Since sensors are constrained in both computational power and energy resources, we do 
not consider asymmetric key cryptography solutions. In addition, we do not consider 
symmetric key cryptography. Since the compromise of a single node makes the entire 
network susceptible to attacks, the proposed scheme is based on efficient one-way hash 
chains [53] in which sensors must verify the source of the beacon message before they 
are able to transmit their data to the beaconing node (mobile sink). 
We introduce the following terminologies, which will be used to describe the 
proposed security scheme: 
 Service Time: A mobile sink arriving at cell j transmits beacon messages for du-
ration of Ts second. Each beacon transmission includes the hash value            
(H n - i (PWj ),i). With i, represent the ith hash value published in cell j during the    
ith visit. All communication cells have the same service time Ts, which can be cal-
culated as follows. 
Ts = 2x/v, where x represent the cell length and v is the mobile sink speed. 
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 Communication Time: Tc, is the time interval in which a sensor node s in cell j 
can directly communicate with the mobile sink and is able to authenticate its bea-
con transmission. Tc is an important metric in the proposed scheme, as it controls 
the number of sensors that will be under attack. 
 
 
 
Fig. 29. The proposed security mechanism 
 
 
 
Fig. 29 illustrates the proposed security mechanism. At the end of the hash values 
distribution scheme, sensor nodes in cells j and j+1 have initial hash values Hn(PWj) and 
Hn(PWj+1), respectively. With n here being a large number, nodes will exhaust their 
energy before reaching n; therefore, it represent the number of times the mobile sink vis-
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its a cell, such as j, during the lifetime of the network. We assume that the mobile sink is 
capable of estimating its (x, y) location, which will use it to determine in which commu-
nication’s cell it’s located. As described in section A, the mobile sink is pre-loaded with 
a table containing a unique password PWj for each cell j in the mobile sink’s communi-
cation path and an index i, which represents the current unpublished hash value in cell j 
during the ith visit.  
Assume the mobile sink in Fig. 29 visit cell j+1 the first time. Initially, sensor 
nodes in cell j+1 only know the hash value Hn(PWj+1). During the cell’s service time, 
the mobile sink includes (Hn-1(PWj+1),i) in its beacon transmission, with index i = 1 (first 
hash value published in cell j+1 during the first visit). Every sensor that hears the first 
beacon can authenticate the mobile sink’s beacon only if H(Hn-1(PWj+1)) = Hn(PWj+1). 
After verification of the first beacon message, sensor nodes in cell j+1 starts a timer with 
Tc sec (communication time), in which when it is expire, sensors ends their data commu-
nication with the mobile sink by replacing Hn(PWj+1) with Hn-1(PWj+1) in their memory. 
Since H( ) is a one-way hash function, when a sensor s replaces his hash value 
Hn(PWj+1) with Hn-1(PWj+1), it cannot authenticate the mobile sink beacons because 
H(Hn-1(PWj+1)) Hn-1(PWj+1). This hash value replacement method allows sensor nodes 
to perform only one hash operation in the reception of mobile sink’s beacons during sub-
sequent visits. As shown in Fig. 28 the mobile sink serves cells j and j+1 simultaneous-
ly. Since the service time for two adjacent cells (cells j and j+1), overlap, the mobile 
sink alternatively includes H n - 1 (PWj) and H n - 1 (PWj+1) in its beacon transmission, and 
gather sensor data from both cells. The sensor communication time controls the scheme 
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security level. With Tc= 2
sT , our anti-threats mechanism eliminates all of the WSN at-
tacks, and with an acceptable data throughput. As the sensor communication time, in-
creases, the proposed scheme trade security performance with higher data throughput. 
 
C. SYSTEM MODEL 
 
We consider a WSN as consisting of N static sensor nodes and one mobile sink. Sensor 
nodes are independently and uniformly distributed over a planar surface with area Anet. 
Sensor nodes have a communication time of Tc. The network is homogeneous, in that all 
sensors are identical. Thus each node has the same amount of energy and uses the same 
communication range R. The mobile sink has a communication range R, and it traverses 
the network using a deterministic path with a speed v. To validate the proposed security 
scheme, we consider the wormhole attack as the threat model. An attacker places a mali-
cious beaconing node within the trusted mobile sink’s path. The malicious node replays 
beacon message originating from the trusted mobile sink, which make sensor nodes be-
lieve that the trusted sink is still in proximity, then sensor nodes start their data transmis-
sion.  
The mobile sink’s communication path is divided into equal grids of size x × y, 
and we assume that the path has the following properties, 
 The set of points on the path is topologically path-connected, meaning that every 
point on the path is reachable from every other point by moving along the path. 
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 The path can be approximated by a straight line over distances of the order of the 
communication range of a sensor. In other words, the radius of curvature at each 
point on the path is large compared the communication path.  
 Each grid has a service time Ts. 
 
 
 
Fig. 30. System model 
 
 
In a time interval of length tj (see Fig. 30), the mobile sink moves a distance vtj 
along cell j transmitting beacon messages. Nodes within the mobile sink range that were 
previously unable to authenticate the mobile sink’s beacon transmission can now verify 
the source of the beacons with the potential to transmit data. During the time interval tj, 
the probability is equal to zero (Pj=0), that at least one sensor node in cell j is under a 
wormhole attack. Since sensor nodes remain within the mobile sink’s range, the recep-
tion of replayed beacons messages triggers sensor nodes to send their data which can be 
received by the trusted mobile sink. 
vTs 
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In the time interval of length t, the mobile sink moves a distance vt away from cell j. 
Some sensor nodes that were previously within range now out of range, making them 
vulnerable to wormhole attack.  
 sin-1 R
yR 4/22 
  
RyRyA )2(4/2/ 22         (4.1) 
vtya           (4.2) 
The network nodes can be modeled as random Poisson points [58]. In each cell, n 
nodes were placed randomly in the interval T, where T is the sensor communication 
time. We consider the time interval t to be the attack interval, in which a sensor node in 
cell j might be under a wormhole attack. The probability that k nodes in cell j will lie in 
the attack interval t: 
p {k in t} = 
  tk e
k
t  
!
,                                      (4.3) 
where
T
n , with 
v
xT   and  
    vtyRyRyxyn  24/2/ 22   
With  =N/Anet (node density), where 
Pj = (the probability that at least one node in cell j lie in the attack interval t ), and 
Pj = 1 - (the probability that no nodes in cell j lie in the attack interval t ). 
Pj = 1 - p {0 in t}        (4.4) 
Pj = 1 - 
te          (4.5) 
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Equation (4.6) represents the probability Pj, that at least one sensor node in cell j 
is under attack. The probability q, in which at least one sensor node under attack is de-
rived as follows: 
We consider two cells under attack (j, i), with attack intervals (ta, tb), respective-
ly. Since the two intervals (ta, tb) are independent and do not overlap. The probability 
z{ka in ta, kb in tb}, that ka and kb sensor nodes lie in the intervals (ta, tb) respectively [58] 
is expressed as: 
z {ka in ta, kb in tb} = 
   
!! b
k
b
t
a
k
a
t
k
t
e
k
t
e
bbaa   
    (4.7) 
q = (the probability of at least one node lying in the attack interval (ta or tb)). 
q = 1 - z {0 in ta, 0 in tb}       (4.8) 
q = 1 - ba tt ee            (4.9) 
And since all communication cells have the same attack interval t (ta tb t). 
q=1-
te 2          (4.10) 
By generalization, equation (4.10) for   cells under wormhole attack intervals. 
q=1-
te           (4.11) 
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D. THREAT ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we show that the proposed security scheme is resilient to several types of 
attacks, such as the wormhole attack [43], [44], [45] and compromised sensors. Our 
scheme is a trade-off between security performance and lower data collection rate. 
Most of the threat models presented in this chapter are based on wormhole at-
tack. In this section, we analyze the wormhole attack, and we show how the proposed 
scheme is resistant to such type of attack. A malicious beaconing node placed within 
grid j replays the trusted mobile sink beacon messages to gather sensor data. Our scheme 
eliminates or limits the effect of a wormhole attack into one communication grid j. The 
communication path is divided into grids. Sensor nodes within each grid have a unique 
hash value which it is used to authenticate the source of the beacon message. As sensor 
nodes are assigned a communication time Tc = 2
sT , the proposed security scheme pre-
vents wormhole attack, and with Tc > 2
sT , the scheme offers enhanced security strength at 
the expense of higher data collection rate. We computed the probability q of at least one 
sensor node under wormhole attack. We consider a WSN with at most eight independent 
wormhole attacks (  malicious beacon nodes placed within the trusted communication 
path). In Fig. 31(a), Fig. 31(b), and Fig. 32, we show the probability q for    [0, 8] 
wormhole attacks, sensor communication time t[ 0, Ts= 80 sec], and with node densi-
ties {50, 200, 1400}. From Fig. 31 and Fig. 32, we observe that the probability q in-
creases rapidly as we increase the WSN node density from 50 nodes in Fig. 31(a) to 
1400 nodes in Fig. 32. In addition, with   cells under attacks, increasing the sensor 
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communication time Tc increases the probability q, since more sensor nodes will lie out-
side the trusted sink’s range and become under wormhole attack. 
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(b) 
Fig. 31. Probability q, that at least one sensor node under wormhole attack for different 
node densities. (a) 50 nodes. (b) 200 nodes 
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Fig. 32. The probability q for a WSN with 1400 nodes 
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Fig 33. The probability q under various node density and sensor communication time 
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Fig. 33 shows the probability q for various node densities. The probability q in-
creases exponentially with node density. Fig. 34 shows the wormhole attack p.d.f for 
various sensor communication time. 
 
 
 
Fig. 34. The wormhole attack probability density function for various sensor communi-
cation time 
 
 
 
E. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
We randomly distribution 400 sensors within 2000×2000 m2 rectangular area. Initially, 
the base station dispatches a mobile sink, it moves at a constant speed 50cm/sec along a 
deterministic data collection path transmitting beacon messages, which divide the data 
collection path into equal grids of size 20m×40m according to the distribution of sen-
sor’s initial hash values. After the distribution of the sensor’s initial hash values, the mo-
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bile sink travels along the data  communication path sending beacon messages to sensors 
that lies within it range (mobile sink  communication range R = 30m). A sensor node 
that hears the data request beacon message, first, it verifies the source of the beacon 
message before it sends its aggregated data to the beaconing node. We investigated the 
impact of wormhole attacks on the proposed security scheme. We evaluated the pro-
posed security scheme with 1, 4, 8, and 16 malicious beacon nodes that were deployed 
within the trusted sink’s data collection path. The malicious nodes were distributed 
among different data collection grid. Fig. 35 shows the effect of sensor communication 
time Tc> 2
sT  on the overall network data transfer rate. Data transfer rate increases as the 
sensor communication increases, since the mobile sink takes longer to collect sensors 
data. The figure also show that as the number of grids under attack increases, the overall 
network data collection rate increases. 
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Fig. 35. The data transfer ratio with 1, 4, 8, and 16 malicious nodes and various sensor 
communication time 
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Fig. 36 shows the aggregated adversary data ratio: the ratio of the number of data 
packets transmitted when sensors hear a replayed beacon message to the total number of 
data packets transmitted. For sensor communication time Tc> 2
sT , this ratio increases as 
the sensor communication interval increases. Since sensors will take longer before they 
can update their hash values, replayed beacon messages transmitted from an attacker 
node can still be verified by the sensors even thought they are outside the trusted mobile 
sink range. We examine the aggregated adversary ratio under 1, 4, 8, and 16 attacker 
nodes. 
We studied the influence of wormhole attacks on the total network energy con-
sumption. For various number of grids, which are under wormhole attacks, as shown in 
Fig. 37, we determined the total network energy consumption for two sensor communi-
cation times (40 sec and 70 sec). 
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Fig. 36. The adversary data ratio with 1, 4, 8, and 16 malicious nodes and various sensor 
communication time 
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Fig. 37. Network energy with various number of cells under attack 
 
 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, we identified new security challenges of using mobile sink for efficient 
data collection. A malicious beaconing node with a high transmission power replays the 
trusted mobile sink’s data request message over the entire network causing large data 
loss. An adversary may easily bring down or even take over the sensor network by plac-
ing a malicious mobile node, which moves along the trusted sink’s pre-determined path. 
In this chapter, we propose a robust security scheme, which allows a sensor to authenti-
cate the data request message to ensure reliable data collection. Through definitive simu-
lations and analysis, we show that our security scheme is robust against severe wireless 
sensor network attacks, such as wormhole attacks and HELLO flood attacks. We present 
a threat analysis and determine the probability that at least a single node is under worm-
hole attack. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANTI WORMHOLE ATTACK SCHEME IN SENSOR NETWORK 
WITH A RANDOM MOBILITY-SINK 
 
As described in the previous chapter, we proposed a security scheme against wormhole 
attack for WSN with MS which use control mobility to gather sensor data.  In this 
chapter, a new technique is proposed, which allows a sink with random mobility to 
establish a secure link with any sensor node on the fly and to defend against threats 
posed by wormhole attacks and collusion of malicious nodes. The proposed technique 
has been tested using the polynomial pool–based key pre-distribution scheme [35], in 
addition to comparison with the scheme proposed by S. Hussain, F. Kausar, and A. 
Massod [48], which will be referred as the random generation key scheme, because the 
two schemes provide minimal communication overhead for sensors to establish pairwise 
keys with the MS compared to other existing schemes [32], [34]. Multiple 
communication channels available on the sensor hardware are used to depict the feature 
of resiliency against wormhole attack and node collusion. 
It is assumed that every sensor node’s hardware including the MS has c available 
communication channels. Prior to network deployment, every sensor node is pre-loaded 
with polynomial shares of a randomly selected subset of polynomials, called the 
polynomial ring. After every sensor node is randomly assigned a subset of polynomials, 
the base station dispatches the MS to gather sensor data; it randomly picks a subset of 
polynomials and assigns them to the MS. All the sensors and the MS use a pre-selected 
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common channel termed the discovery channel. A sensor node uses the discovery 
channel to detect whether it is within proximity of the MS. It uses this channel to 
establish both a common encryption key and a secure channel with the MS to transfer its 
encrypted data. The MS can establish a pairwise key with any sensor node on the fly. 
For every sensor node u, which wants to communicate securely with the MS, the two 
must first establish a common key. Second, the MS randomly picks a secure channel 
from a set of c available channels and assigns it to the sensor node u; the node u uses this 
secret channel for a specified period of Ts seconds to transfer its encrypted data to the 
MS. Through probabilistic analyses, it has been shown that even when 50% of a sensor 
node’s neighbors are malicious devices, the provision of with a single extra channel for 
communication with the MS brings down the probability of a wormhole attack to nearly 
zero. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section A describes the sensor-
network architecture. Section B introduces the proposed technique. Section C discusses 
the threat analysis. Section D presents the performance evaluation. Section E concludes 
the study. 
 
A. SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
 
A typical sensor network that has hundred to several thousand low-cost, power-
constrained nodes with limited computational power and storage capability has been 
considered. Each sensor has c available channels and is capable of dynamically 
switching between them. Nodes conserve energy by aggregating the data in their internal 
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buffer. The network has a high-end MS. The MS is more powerful than any sensor. It 
has enhanced capability for computation, communication, energy supply, and storage, 
and it cannot be compromised. It acts as an agent to collect sensor reading. The MS 
dynamically assigns a communication channel from a set of c available channels to any 
sensor node on the fly.  
The key-establishment patterns between any two nodes or between a node (e.g. 
node i) and the MS falls into two categories: direct key establishment (e.g. both the MS 
and a sensor node i share at least a common bivariate polynomial); indirect path key 
establishment (e.g. MS and node i execute the path key establishment through an 
intermediate node j, which shares a common polynomial with both the MS and the 
sensor node i, and the MS generates a new shared key that will be sent to i over the 
secure path MS—j—i. 
In this article, a sensor network, with sensor nodes numbering more than 1000 and 
nodes within the MS’s communication range exceeding 30 nodes, has been considered. 
 
B. THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE 
 
A new technique is herein proposed to minimize the threats posed by wormhole attacks. 
This technique relies on the assumption that any physical device has only one radio. It is 
also assumed that a radio is incapable of simultaneously sending or receiving on more 
than one channel.  
After network deployment, every sensor node is pre-loaded with polynomial 
shares of a randomly selected subset of polynomials. The base station dispatches the MS  
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Fig. 38. Sensor node under wormhole attack in WSN with random mobility-sink node 
 
 
to gather sensor data securely. The MS is loaded with its randomly selected subset of 
polynomials. 
Initially, all sensor nodes including the MS have their radios tuned to a pre-
selected common channel, called the discovery channel. The MS traverses the network 
that transmits beacon messages over the discovery channel; the beacon message contains 
the MS ID. Sensors that are in proximity of the MS can hear the MS beacons. Each 
sensor will engage its polynomial pool-based key scheme [35] to establish a pairwise 
key with the MS through either direct key establishment or by the path-key discovery. 
For every sensor node u that lies within the MS range (see Fig. 38) and establishes a 
common key k with MS, the MS picks a channel fi, from a set of c available channels {f1, 
f2, f3, …., fc-1, fc}. The MS then sends the message {fi}k over the discovery channel to 
sensor node u. The sensor node u receives the encrypted message, decrypts it using the 
shared key k, and tunes its radio to the specific channel for a period of Ts seconds. Node 
   u 
   
   Sensor under attack 
 
MS                             Attacker                  Sensor 
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u uses this secret channel fi to transmit encrypted data messages {data}k to the MS. After 
Ts seconds, the sensor node u switches back its radio to the discovery channel. It is 
assumed that the distribution of the different channels over the sensor nodes follows a 
uniform distribution. From the randomly assigned list of channels, the MS picks a 
channel fj and switches its radio from the discovery channel to fj for a specified period of 
ts sec, where ts << Ts. The MS transmits a stream of data-pull beacon messages over the 
channel fj and listens to it. Sensor nodes that are in the proximity of the MS’s range and 
have their radios tuned in to fj hear the MS transmission and reply back by sending their 
encrypted data messages to the MS. If no sensor nodes in the range of the MS have their 
radios tuned in to this channel, the MS deletes this channel from the list of assigned 
channels. After time ts, the MS tunes its radio back to the discovery channel and 
transmits a burst of beacons that contains its ID, so that sensor nodes that were not in the 
MS’s range before and now are within range will be able to establish a secure 
communication link with the MS. Similarly, the process is repeated with every channel 
chosen by the MS from the list of assigned channels.  It is, however, assumed that all the 
assigned channels are chosen equally from the list. 
 
C. THREAT ANALYSIS 
 
To mount a wormhole attack [43], an adversary initially establishes a direct link between 
two points in the network. The attacker’s link is referred to as the wormhole link. Once 
the wormhole link is established, the attacker eavesdrops on the messages at one end of 
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the link, referred as the origin point, tunnels them through the wormhole link and replays 
them at the other end, referred as the destination point.  
In sensor networks with MS, the use of a single channel for communication 
between sensor nodes and MS makes the probability of a wormhole attack 
approximately unity. An attacker that is in the proximity of the MS can easily record the 
MS messages, tunnel them through an established wormhole link, and replay them at the 
other end of the link. Thus, using channel diversity for secure communication helps 
minimize this threat. In this work, a wormhole attack launched by a single malicious 
node using the discovery channel is not considered a continuous threat because the 
attacked node will use the wormhole link to switch its communication channel from the 
discovery channel to a channel assigned by the MS, which will prevent any further 
attacks from the malicious node. A successful wormhole attack will be accomplished 
when a sensor node begins sending its encrypted data messages although it is not within 
the MS range. Two malicious nodes need to collude to launch a successful wormhole 
attack. One of the two malicious nodes must have its radio tuned in to the discovery 
channel and the other to any other available channel.  
As a concrete example, consider a sensor node u that has m legitimate neighbors 
and n malicious nodes within its communication range. The sensor u’s radio has c 
available communication channels. Suppose that out of the c available channels, a subset 
of r channels is chosen by the n malicious nodes to launch a wormhole attack. Each of 
the r channels is assumed to be equally chosen by g malicious nodes, where r
ng .    
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Now, suppose that a nodes from u neighbors are located within the MS range, 
where a   g, the probability pa of a successful wormhole attack is  


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where   = a if a r ; otherwise,   = r. 
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q(i-wormhole links) is the probability of having i wormhole links, each with a different 
channel being randomly selected among the r channels. 
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D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
Fig. 39 [(a) & (b)] shows the probability pa of a sensor u with varied number of 
wormhole links and different malicious node ratios [0.2, 1] when 5 of the sensor u’s 
neighbors became within the MS range. In Fig. 39(a), the probability pa has been 
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calculated with 5 communication channels available for u and each of its malicious 
neighbors. Similarly, in Fig. 39(b), pa is calculated with 15 communication channels 
available for u and each of its neighboring nodes. The figures show that for a given 
number of wormhole links, a set of c channels available for sensor u, and a subset of r 
channels available for each of u’s malicious neighbors, the probability of a wormhole 
attack increases exponentially with the malicious node ratio. The figures also show that 
as the number of channels available to sensor u increases, the probability pa decreases. 
Fig. 40 shows the probability pa for a sensor u with 20 legitimate nodes, 40 
malicious nodes within its communication range, and varying number of channels 
available to the malicious nodes. For a given number of r channels available to the 
malicious nodes, as the number of sensor u’s available channels increases, the 
probability pa decreases exponentially. Fig. 41 shows the probability pa with c = 2 and 
different numbers of neighbors of a sensor being within the MS range.   
    The security resilience of the proposed technique against attacks caused by node 
collusion is investigated. An attacker randomly compromised of x sensor nodes is 
assumed. In the case of the captured bivariate polynomials of degree t, the attacker 
cannot determine the non-compromised polynomial-based key if he/she has captured no 
more than t sensors. 
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(b) 
Fig. 39. The probability of a successful wormhole attack vs. the malicious node ratio 
with varied number of wormhole links 
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Fig. 40. The probability of successful wormhole attack 
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Fig. 41. The probability of a wormhole attack with c =2 and with various number of 
neighbors for a sensor being under attack 
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Now, let us assume the case where the number of compromised sensors x > t. 
The probability of any polynomial being chosen for a sensor node is
s
s  , and the 
probability of this polynomial being chosen exactly j times among the x compromised 
sensor nodes is represented by D. Liu, P. Ning, and R. Li [35]. 
jxj
s
s
s
s
j
x
jq
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Thus, the probability of a polynomial-based key being compromised between 
non-compromised sensors is. 
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The probability that a data-communication link between the MS and any 
uncompromised sensor being compromised and it is under wormhole attacks.  
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Now, the proposed technique is compared with its use in the scheme described 
by S. Hussain, F. Kausar, and A. Massod [48]. Fig. 42(a) shows the probability pwc that a 
data-communication link between a MS and any uncompromised sensor being 
compromised and it being under a wormhole attack when using the polynomial pool–
based scheme, Fig. 42(b) shows the probability pwc when using the random generation 
key scheme Fig. 42 [(a) & (b)] clearly shows  that  the proposed technique  when used in 
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(b) 
Fig. 42. The probability that a data-communication link between MS and uncompro-
mised sensor is being compromised and it’s under a wormhole attack when using either 
the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme as in (a) or the random genera-
tion key scheme as in (b) 
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conjunction with the polynomial pool–based scheme performs much better than when it 
is used with the random generation key scheme .Furthermore, the threats posed by a 
wormhole attack used in combination with eavesdropping are herein investigated. In this 
type of attack, the adversary launches wormhole attacks on a sensor node that has n of its 
neighboring nodes as malicious devices; these malicious nodes can easily coordinate an 
eavesdropping attack on the sensor node with the help of the wormhole. For a sensor 
node with a set of c channels available for communication with the MS and n malicious 
neighboring nodes, where each malicious node is capable of tuning its radio to a channel 
randomly chosen from its set of r available channels, the probability pd that the sensor 
node can be under eavesdropping attack is 
c
r . It is assumed that an adversary has 
captured x sensor nodes; for an uncompromised sensor node that is under wormhole 
attack and has n of its neighbors as malicious and eavesdroppers, the probability that at 
least one of the sensor’s malicious neighbors is able to recover data messages sent over 
the wormhole to the MS is  
c
rpp wcr            (5.5) 
Fig. 43 [(a), (b)] and Fig. 44 shows the relationship pr and the number of 
compromised sensor nodes using the proposed technique in combination with the 
polynomial pool–based key pre-distribution scheme [35] and the random generation key 
scheme, which are referred to as scheme 1 and scheme 2, respectively.   
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(b) 
Fig. 43. The probability Pr vs. number of compromised sensors using the proposed tech-
nique in conjunction with either the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme 
or the random generation key scheme which we refer to scheme 1 and scheme 2 respec-
tively (25% in (a) and 50% in (b) of neighboring nodes are malicious) 
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Fig. 44. The probability Pr v.s. number of compromised sensors using the proposed 
technique in conjunction with either the polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution 
scheme or the random generation key scheme which we refer to scheme 1 and scheme 2 
respectively (82% of neighboring nodes are malicious) 
 
 
 
 
E. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, a security scheme for WSN with a MS is presented, which improves the 
resilience of the network against wormhole attacks and node collusion. In addition, the 
proposed scheme illustrates the threshold property: when the number of compromised 
sensors is less than the threshold, the probability that any uncompromised sensor being 
compromised is close to zero. The proposed scheme uses the polynomial pool-based key 
pre-distribution scheme [35] and the multiple channels available on the sensor hardware. 
It allows the MS to establish a direct secure link with any sensor node and over a 
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communication channel randomly selected from a set of c available channels. Through 
quantitative analysis, it has been shown that this technique functions very well in terms 
of resilience to wormhole and eavesdropping devices. The results show that with c = 5, a 
= 5, r = 5, and 50% of a sensor node’s neighbors being malicious nodes, the probability 
of a wormhole attack is approximately zero for varying numbers of wormhole links. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT DATA COLLECTION SCHEME IN SENSOR 
NETWORK WITH MS 
 
In this chapter we investigate the employment of the traditional multi-hop approach in a 
multi-events monitoring sensor network. Such a network may exist for studying active 
volcanoes to collect seismic, temperature data, infrasonic signals, and detection of big 
eruptions. Data from the active volcanoes site is sensed and periodically reported to the 
base station. These sensor measurements can tolerate high latency, as geologists analyze 
data and draw conclusions with which to predict future eruptions. They do not require 
real time action. Meanwhile the detection of big eruption triggers sensor nodes to record 
the occurrence of the event to the base station with low latency and high data fidelity. 
The network uses this sensor reading to activate the alarm system. For this class of sen-
sor application the network provides sensor readings with varied delivery delay con-
straints. We further explore the drawbacks on network performance and total network 
energy usage of using the traditional multi-hop scheme to route sensor readings. In our 
implementation, we consider two types of sensor reading: high-priority data (detection 
of big eruption) requiring low latency and high fidelity, and low-priority data (seismic, 
infrasonic signals and temperature) with high latency and low fidelity. One of the major 
energy expenditures in this type of sensor network is in communicating the low-priority 
sensor reading from the sensors to a base station. Usually, these reading are observed 
from the environment periodically (for example a low-priority packet might be generated 
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by a sensor node every 2 sec) and relayed to a base station using ad hoc multi-hop routes 
in the sensor network. A drawback with this approach, however, is that the sensor nodes 
closer to the base station relay high-priority and low-priority sensor readings from all the 
nodes in the network. Thus, nodes closest to the base station drain their batteries faster 
than those in the remaining network, which will lead to non-uniform depletion of energy 
in the sensor network. Once the nodes that are within direct communication with the 
base station have exhausted their energy, the network is disconnected. Another problem 
is the additional energy expenditure inherent in the multi-hop scheme to relay low-
priority data to the base station in a multi-events network. Since low-priority data can 
tolerate high latency, we propose a new hybrid data delivery scheme which maintains 
the same delivery delay for high-priority data as the multi-hop approach and trades la-
tency for energy in the case of low-priority data delivery. Our scheme will optimize the 
network performance and reduce the total network energy usage compared with the tra-
ditional ad hoc approach.  
Our goal is to optimize the energy consumption at nodes near the base station 
and maximize the lifetime of the remaining nodes by minimizing the energy spent for 
relaying low-priority data to the base station. We implemented a dual communication 
sensor network with a mobile node. Mobile entities exist in the environment, and a data 
aggregation node with a finite amount of resources can be attached to these mobile enti-
ties for low-priority data collection. In our work, the mobile node is part of the network 
infrastructure itself and can be controlled by the network as required. A mobile node 
moving through the network deployment region can collect low-priority data from the 
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static nodes over a single hop radio link as and when the mobile node is within radio 
range of the static nodes. This reduces multi-hop relaying of low-priority data and re-
duces energy consumption at nodes closer to the base station. This arrangement may in-
crease the latency of low-priority data, but it is acceptable. The mobile node periodically 
visits the base station to drop off the collected low-priority data. To ensure low latency 
and high fidelity, high-priority data are relayed over multi-hop routes to the base station. 
Low-priority data and high-priority data propagate over the network over two separate 
communication channels to minimize packet collision and hence improve the network 
throughput. The proposed approach shows how a significant advantage in network life-
time can be gained if some of the energy spent in relaying low-priority data can be 
saved.   
This chapter is organized as follows: Section A summarizes related work. Sec-
tion B explains the methodologies used in our approach to improve network perfor-
mance and reduce energy consumption. Section C clarifies the communication protocol 
used by the mobile node to collect and transfer low-priority data to the base station. Sec-
tion G presents the system evaluation of two large, dense networks using a dual-
communication hybrid data delivery scheme and the traditional ad hoc network ap-
proach. Finally, section H concludes the chapter. 
 
A. RELATED WORKS 
 
Exploiting mobility in the domain of wireless sensor networks to maximize sensor net-
work lifetime [59], [60], [61], [62], [63] by reducing the communication energy dictated 
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by the sensor has received much attention recently. Mobility can be generally classified 
into three categories: random, predictable [64], and controlled. Assuming all nodes are 
mobile, random mobility ameliorates the network data capacity [65]. Mobile entities 
with random motion were also considered for communication in [10] and [11], in which 
the mobile entities were designated zebras in [10] and whales in [11]. Exploiting mobile 
entities with random motion has been also studied in [66], where these randomly moving 
entities act as data mules to carry data from sensor to access point. Mules are assumed to 
be capable of short-range wireless communication and can exchange data as they pass by 
sensors and access points. Mules collect data from the sensors, store them in a buffer, 
and later on drop off the collected data as it pass by an access point. In all cases of ran-
dom mobility, however, the unpredictable arrival time of the mobile entity at the sensor 
node may lead to excessive data caching at the sensor node and result in buffer over-
flows. 
Predictable mobility was introduced in [67] in which a bus acts as mobile ob-
server in wide area sensor network. The mobile observer follows a periodic schedule of 
movement. Static sensor nodes were placed near the bus trajectory in which all static 
nodes have direct communication links with mobile node. A sensor node learns the bus’s 
arrival time, wakes up, and starts its data transfer with the mobile node. The drawback of 
this predictable mobility is that all sensor nodes must be in direct communication with 
the mobile node. This will not be practical in random sensor network such as those dep-
loyed for battlefield surveillance and wildfire observation, in which the presence of ob-
stacles in the network environment prevents the mobile node from ensuring a direct 
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communication with all static nodes. With controlled mobility, in which sensor nodes 
have a limited mobility range [17], they can modify their locations to come within direct 
communication of a mobile node having a long mobility range.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 45. The sensor network with one mobile node 
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B. NETWORK WITH MOBILE NODE 
 
Our sensor network architecture is illustrated in Fig. 45. The network is used for moni-
toring and recording several types of events. Events are classified into two different cate- 
  
 
 
Fig. 46. The sensor node primary and secondary radios 
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a local multi-hop route, which connects a source node to node that is within direct com-
munication of the mobile node.  The mobile node acts as a low-priority data collection 
node with massive storage capability, rechargeable energy source, and it has no sensing 
functionality. The mobile node communicates directly with the static sensor via a single 
radio at a frequency band f2, and furnishes a communication range of r1. It periodically 
sends a stream of beacon packets. Nodes in the mobile node communication path receiv-
ing a beacon start contending for the channel to transfer their aggregated data to the mo-
bile node. Controlled mobility is being used in our system architecture, in which the mo-
bile node moves repeatedly along a deterministic route to collect low-priority data from 
static sensor over a single-hop radio link. The mobile node visits the base station period-
ically to offload its collected data. As shown in Fig. 45, a source node sends its high-
priority data packet to the base station over a primary multi-hop route. However, a 
source node with a low-priority data packet relays its data to the nearest static node that 
is within a single-hop radio link of the mobile node. Sensor nodes in the mobile node 
communication path buffer the low-priority data received from nodes, which are not in 
the mobile node communication path, and avoid further relaying of the data. This 
scheme reduces the total number of hops required to transmit a low-priority data packet 
from the source to the base station, and hence minimize packet collisions, increase spa-
tial reuse, improve network throughput, and reduce the total network energy usage. 
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C. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS BETWEEN SENSOR NODES AND THE 
MOBILE NODE 
 
This section describes the communication protocols developed to facilitate the data 
transfer process in three phases as shown in Fig. 47 and discussed in detail below. The 
mobile node transmits three distinct types of beacon packets. 
a. Beacon formation packet: Each beacon packet contains the mobile node MAC 
address. The mobile node periodically broadcasts a stream of beacon formation 
packets during the formation phase in order to form the low-priority data aggre-
gation zone.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 47. The three phases used during the mobile node communication protocol 
 
 
 
b. Beacon Deformation packet: it contains the mobile node MAC address and the 
remaining time for the next data transfer duration. To deconstruct a low-priority 
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tion packet. The mobile node uses this type of beacon packet to collect low-
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priority data that were aggregated in nodes, which lies within the mobile node 
communication path.  
 
D. FORMATION OF THE LOW-PRIORITY DATA AGGREGATION ZONE 
 
The first phase is forming the low-priority aggregation zone in the network. It is a con-
struction phase, and essential information required for subsequent phases is collected in 
this phase. In addition, it lasts for the duration of single path traversal by the mobile 
node. This training phase may be repeated at any time to adapt to network dynamic 
(such as node addition, deletion, construction of new data aggregation zone). The 
scheme used for forming the low-priority data aggregation zone is described below. 
As mentioned earlier, the mobile node traverses the network over a fixed path (see Fig. 
45). In the first path traversal, the mobile node moves along the path, broadcasting bea-
con formation packets periodically in band f2. Nodes lying within the mobile node com-
munication path receive the beacon formation packet and become data-aggregated nodes 
for relay of low-priority data, and, at the same time, they continue relaying high-priority 
data. In order to guarantee that nodes near the mobile node M moving path receive at 
least one beacon, the listen interval of the node secondary radio listen interval’s TRX  as 
shown in Fig. 48 needs to be at least as long as the transmit time of a beacon plus the 
inter-beacon interval TB.  To ensure that the mobile node M produce a continuous low-
priority data aggregation zone, it periodically transmits a stream of beacon formation 
packets during the beacon duration Tf every Tt seconds. Table I shows the protocol pa-
rameters used in the design. 
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Fig. 48. Data transfer process between nodes that’s 
lies in the low-priority data aggregation zone and 
the mobile node  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: PROTOCOL PARAMETER 
VALUES 
                Radio Parameters    Values 
Mobile Radio Interval  ( Tt )   250 ms  
Beacon Duration  ( Tf )   100 ms 
Data Transfer Duration  ( TD )   150 ms 
Beacon Interval  ( TB )   1 ms 
Sensor Node Radio Interval  ( TS )   100 ms 
Sensor Node Listen Duration  ( TRX )   2 ms 
Data Rate 2.4 Kbps 
Transmission Power    14.88 mW 
Receiving Power 12.50 mW 
Idle Power 12.36 mW 
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E. DATA TRANSFER BETWEEN AGGREGATED NODE AND MOBILE NODE 
 
Once the aggregation zone is established, nodes lying in the mobile node communication 
path store forwarded low-priority data in their internal buffer and avoid further relaying 
to reduce the energy consumed by hop communication and minimize packet collisions, 
since fewer packets are relayed to the base station over the ad-hoc multi-hop route. As 
illustrated in Fig. 48, the mobile node M moves along the network periodically broad-
casting a stream of the beacon data pull packets. Nodes within the low-priority data-
aggregation zone that hear the node M broadcast, such as nodes A and B, indicate the 
arrival of the low-priority data collection node. When Nodes B and A receive at least 
one beacon, they use information included in the beacon packet to set their timers eto 1 
and 2, respectively, where 1 and 2 are time remaining in the next data transfer interval. 
Since nodes A and B use their secondary radios, operating at a duty cycle of 2%, to 
communicate with the mobile node, the aggregated nodis unable to transfer a large 
amount of data to the mobile node during the data transfer duration. Moreover, since less 
data are being transferred each time in a node having direct contact with the mobile 
node, nodes will endure a fast buffer overflow and excessive data drop. In our approach, 
nodes turn their secondary radios on during the entire data transfer duration to increase 
the data transfer rate, and at the end of the data transfer duration they switch back to 
normal operation. During the data transfer duration nodes, such as A and B, contend for 
the channel to transfer their aggregated data to the mobile node. If the mobile node rece-
ives a data packet successfully, it replays back by sending an acknowledgment to the 
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source node, which verified to the source node that the connection is active and the data 
was reliably delivered. 
 
F. DEFORMATION OF THE LOW-PRIORITY DATA AGGREGATION ZONE 
 
During this phase, the mobile node transmits a train of beacon deformation packets 
along its moving path. Nodes near the mobile node communication path receive at least 
one beacon packet and become a non-aggregated node for low-priority data, and, at the 
same time, transfer any stored data that have not been previously transferred to the mo-
bile node. In this phase, nodes lying in the deconstructing path will no longer be within 
the mobile node path. In order to minimize data loss, we increase the data transfer rate 
during this phase by decreasing the mobile node speed to its minimum value.     
                        
G. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
This section describes the simulation setup used in the process of system development. 
Our scheme was implemented using the ns-2 network simulator. We analyzed the pro-
posed scheme through extensive simulations. Two sensor networks with node densities 
of 256 and 356 were considered in our evaluation. In both networks, sensor nodes had a 
fixed buffer size and were uniformly distributed over a field of 450×450 m2 square area. 
First, we considered the static multi-hop network where all data (low-priority and high-
priority) is relayed over a multi-hop topology. Second, we considered the same networks 
deployment with a mobile node where all data with high-priority is relayed over a multi-
hop route, and data with low-priority are locally relayed to aggregated nodes, which 
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store the data in their internal buffer until the arrival of the mobile node. We used the 
following performance metrics in our evaluation. 
 Low-priority delivery success ratio: The ratio of the total number of low-priority 
packets successfully received by the sink node to the total number of generated 
packets. 
 High-priority delivery success ratio. The ratio of total number of high-priority 
packets successfully received by the sink to the total number of generated packets. 
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Fig. 49. Overall delivery success ratio under various traffic loads 
 
 
 
 
 Total network energy reduction percentage. The total percentage of energy reduc-
tion.  
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The above performance metrics were determined under different traffic loads. 
We changed the traffic load by varying the message inter-arrival period. If the message 
inter-arrival period is 0.2 s, a message is generated every 0.2 s by the source node. In this 
experiment, the message inter-arrival period varied from 0.01 s to 1 s. Under various 
traffic loads, the proposed system achieved a higher overall delivery ratio than the static 
multi-hop network for the two densities, as shown in Fig. 49. For the highest traffic load 
with a low-priority message generated every 0.01 s, our approach attained a higher over-
all delivery ratio compared with the multi-hop approach. Fig. 50 shows how a network 
with a mobile node acting as a low-priority data collection node improves the low-
priority delivery ratio. Because low-priority data are locally relayed to the nearest aggre-
gated node, then further transferred to the mobile node to avoid hop communication at 
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Fig. 50. Low-priority data delivery success ratio for various traffic loads 
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the time the mobile node contact the aggregated node. This method reduces the number 
of hop communications, decreases packet collisions, and, hence, ameliorates the low-
priority delivery success ratio. For the high-priority delivery success ratio (see Fig. 51), 
our design and the static multi-hop method obtains about the same delivery ratio since 
high-priority data are send over multi-hop routes in both approaches to ensure low laten-
cy and high data fidelity.  
Fig. 52 shows the total network energy reduction percentage between the two 
schemes under varied traffic loads. At the highest traffic load, the proposed design 
achieves total energy reduction of about 85% and 65% for densities 256 and 360, respec-
tively. For low traffic loads, we obtain an energy reduction of 25% and 30% for densities 
256 and 360, respectively. In the proposed approach energy reduction occurs by reduc-
ing the total number of hop communication required to relayed low-priority packets. 
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Fig. 51. High-priority delivery success ratio for various traffic loads 
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Fig.  52. Total network energy reduction ( %) under various traffic loads 
 
 
 
 
For the proposed scheme we also studied the effect of the sensor node buffer size 
on the low-priority delivery ratio for node density 256. Low-priority data and high-
priority data were generated at a fixed message inter-arrival period 0.4 sec. The mobile 
traversing the sensor field at constant speed 10 m/sec to collect low-priority data from 
nodes that are lying in the mobile node communication path. As shown in Fig. 53 when 
the sensor node buffer size is small (10 data packets) the low-priority delivery ratio is 
less than 0.1, since the small buffer size may causes excessive data dropped which will 
degrade the low-priority delivery ratio. As the buffer size increases the delivery ratio in-
creases to about 0.88 at 100.   
To further visualize the relaying overhead, we plotted the total average number 
of low-priority packets transmitted under different traffic loads for density 256 in Fig. 
54. Low-priority packets transmitted in the network with the mobile node required fewer 
hop communications than the network without the mobile node. In the network with one 
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mobile node and 256 static nodes, 63% of the average transmitted packets required at 
least four communication hops to reach the base station. In the network without the mo-
bile node, however, about 11% of the average transmitted packets are delivered to the 
base station using at least four communication hops. buffer size is small (10 data pack-
ets) the low-priority delivery ratio is less than 0.1, since the small buffer size may causes 
excessive data dropped which will degrade the low-priority delivery ratio. As the buffer 
size increases the delivery ratio increases to about 0.88 at 100.   
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Fig. 53. The effect of the sensor node buffer size on the low-priority delivery ratio at 
fixed traffic load 
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Fig. 54. Relaying overhead for the two low-priority data gathering approaches with node 
density 256 
 
 
H. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, we explored the possibility of using a mobile device for data transfer in 
sensor networks that provide low-priority data with high-latency and extreme high-
fidelity data with low-latency. The motivation was to save energy in the embedded sen-
sor node and increase the useful service life of a deployed system. The key intuition was 
that using a mobile node to collect low-priority data that were aggregated in nodes, 
which lies within the mobile node communication path. Our system establishes shorter 
low-priority data routes, reducing the data-relaying overhead. The simulation result 
shows that the proposed system improves the network delivery success ratio and reduces 
the total network energy consumption by about 88% during high traffic load and about 
25% during low traffic. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
Countermeasure attack schemes and security services such as sink authentication and 
pairwise key establishment are important in many sensor networks applications.  In this 
dissertation, we examine two security challenges for wireless sensor network with MS: 
First, is to cultivate efficient security schemes with low communication overhead that 
use authentication and pairwise key establishment between sensor nodes and MS to tole-
rate nodes capture and mobile sink replication attack. Sink mobility imposes extra com-
munication overhead on these constrained resource sensor nodes to establish secure links 
with the MS. This extra communication overhead are obtained because of the frequent 
exchange of cryptography keying information between the sensors and MS each time the 
MS update its location unlike sensor network with a fixed localized sink. Where after 
deployment, sensors and the sink exchange cryptography keying information only once 
to establish a securely connected network. The other challenge is to develop security 
techniques that are based on key pre-distribution schemes to provide network’s resilien-
cy against wormhole attack. 
 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 We identified several drawbacks in both the probabilistic key pre-distribution 
scheme and the Q-composite scheme if used in a WSN with MS. Both schemes 
have high communication overhead and also as the number of compromised 
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nodes increases, the fraction of affected pairwise keys increases quickly As a re-
sult, a small number of compromised nodes may affect a large fraction of pair-
wise keys and will then lead to a large scale mobile sink replication attack. We 
proposed two schemes that are based on the polynomial pool scheme, the proba-
bilistic generation key pre-distribution scheme, and the Q-composite scheme. 
The schemes uses a common polynomial and Q common generation keys to es-
tablish a secure pairwise key between MS and the sensor node, where Q ≥ 1. Our 
security analysis indicate that these schemes assure, with high probability and 
low communication overhead, that any sensor node can establish a secure a link 
with MS. Furthermore, our analytical results clearly show that our schemes per-
form better in terms of network resilience to nodes capture than exiting schemes 
if used in WSN with MS. 
 We investigate the problem of using a single key pool in existing key pre-
distribution schemes for pairwise key establishment and authentication between 
sensors and mobile sink. For example, in the basic probabilistic and the Q-
composite key pre-distribution schemes, an attacker can easily gain control to the 
network by deploying a replicated mobile sink preloaded with some compro-
mised keys. We propose a three-tier general framework that permit the use of any 
pairwise key pre-distribution scheme as its basic component. The new framework 
require two separate key pools, one for the mobile sink to access the network, 
and one for pairwise key establishment between sensors.  To further reduce the 
damages caused by stationary access node replication attack, we strengthen the 
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authentication mechanism between the sensor and the stationary access node in 
the proposed scheme. To facilities our study we choose the polynomial pool 
scheme as the basic component in our scheme. Through detailed analysis and 
with 10% of the sensor nodes in the network carrying a polynomial from the mo-
bile pool, for a mobile polynomial to be recovered in order to lunch a mobile sink 
replication attack, the attacker would have to capture 21% times more nodes as 
compared with the single polynomial pool approach. 
 We identified the problem of using one channel for communication and single 
authentication code by sensor nodes to verify the source of the MS beacon mes-
sage, where an adversary can record the MS beacon transmission in one part of 
the network, tunnels the recorded message over low-latency channel and replays 
them at a different part of the same network. In this dissertation, we propose an 
efficient security scheme to tolerate wormhole attack, which divides the sink’s 
data collection path into unique authentication grids, sensors in each grid, uses 
secret keying information and collision-resistant hash functions to authenticate 
the source of beacons. Through probabilistic analysis and definitive simulation, 
the proposed scheme shows with 60% of the grids under wormhole attacks, the 
probability that a node reply to a malicious beacon is 0.1. Furthermore we pro-
pose a scheme that involves leveraging channels diversity and the polynomial 
pool-based key pre-distribution scheme to tolerate wormhole attack. It allows the 
MS to establish a direct secure link with any sensor node and over a communica-
tion channel randomly selected from a set of c available channels. Through quan-
  
120
titative analyses, it is shown that even when 50% of a sensor node’s neighbors 
are malicious devices, the provision of one extra available channel for communi-
cation with the mobile sink reduces the probability of a wormhole attack to al-
most zero. 
 We propose an energy-efficient hybrid data collection architecture [21] based on 
controllably mobile infrastructure for a class of applications in which sensor net-
works provide both low-priority and high-priority data. High-priority data require 
a data delivery scheme with low latency and high fidelity. Meanwhile low-
priority data may tolerate high-latency data delivery. The simulation result shows 
that the proposed system improves the network delivery success ratio and reduc-
es the total network energy consumption by about 88% during high traffic load 
and about 25% during low traffic. 
 
B. FUTURE WORKS 
We developed a number of key pre-distribution schemes to tolerate nodes capture and 
node replication attack. The proposed schemes provide high resiliency when the number 
of captured nodes are less than a threshold value, however as the number of captured 
nodes exceed this threshold value, the network resiliency against nodes capture and node 
replication attacks dramatically decreases. It will be interesting to design key pre-
distribution schemes that are capable of dynamically increasing the network resiliency 
when the number of nodes captured reaches a critical value. One technique that can be 
taken is to enables a wireless sensor network with mobile sink to dynamically update its 
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resiliency is to allow sensor nodes and with the help of the MS to dynamically re-keying 
when the number of compromised keys approaches captious value. The other approach 
is eliminate the threats impose by captured keys by revoking.  
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